Fish. Nociception and pain. A biological perspective by Segner, Helmut
Helmut Segner
Fish
Nociception and pain 
A biological perspective
s
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.
or
g/
10
.7
89
2/
bo
ri
s.
41
32
1 
| 
do
wn
lo
ad
ed
: 
13
.3
.2
01
7
Editor: Federal Committee on Non-Human Biotechnology ECNH  
and Ariane Willemsen, Bern © ECNH
Graphic design: Atelier Bundi, Boll
Publisher: Federal Office for Buildings and Logistics (FOBL), Bern, 2012 
Cover picture: © Getty Images
Distribution: FOBL, Distribution of Publications, CH-3003 Bern
www.bundespublikationen.admin.ch, no 810.010.en
ISBN: 978-3-905782-08-0
About the Author
Helmut Segner is Professor at the Vetsuisse Faculty of the Univer-
sity of Bern and directs the Centre for Fish and Wildlife Health. 
In his research, he focusses on the role of environmental factors 
and processes, both natural and human, on fish health and disease.
Contents
Preface    7
1. Introduction  9
2. Nociception and pain perception in man 14
 2.1  Nociception: peripheral sensing of noxious stimuli 16
 2.2   Processing of nociceptive information at the spinal  
cord level  19
 2.3  The human brain: from nociception to pain 20
3. Nociception and pain perception in fish 31
 3.1  Nociception  32
 3.2  Pain perception: neuroanatomical evidence 35
   3.2.1 The fish brain 35
   3.2.2 Neuroanatomical correlates of pain perception 38
 3.3  Pain perception: neurophysiological evidence  47
 3.4  Pain perception: behavioural evidence 50
   3.4.1 Fish cognition 50
   3.4.2  Behavioural responses of fish to noxious   
stimuli  59
4. Consciousness in fish 67
5. Conclusions  76
Acknowledgements  79
References    80
Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology 7
Preface
In spring 2010, the Federal Ethics Committee on Non-Human 
Bio technology (ECNH; Eidgenössische Ethikkommission für die 
Biotechnologie im Ausserhumanbereich, EKAH) commissioned 
two studies on pain perception and consciousness in fish. Both 
studies were intended to critically review the recent literature on 
cognitive abilities of fish and their capability to feel pain. These 
questions can be approached both from a biological perspective 
and from a philosophical perspective, as the issues of conscious-
ness and cognition are not only a matter of biological facts – which 
fall within the competence of life sciences – but also a matter of 
notions and terms, which are within the competence of philoso-
phy. Therefore, two studies were done in parallel, with one report 
written by a biologist (Helmut Segner), and one written by a phi-
losopher (Markus Wild). 
The two reports can be read independently of each other; how-
ever, they are complementary in many aspects. While, for instance, 
Markus Wild’s report touches only shortly on the neurological 
basis of pain perception in man and fish, Helmut Segner’s report 
places great emphasis on this aspect. In contrast, while Segner’s 
report provides little detail on the terminology and notion of 
conscious ness, Wild presents a systematic and in-depth discussion 
of this aspect. 
We investigated the same topic from different perspectives. 
Despite our differences in background, methodological approach, 
focus, argumentation and assessments, we converge and agree in 
the two major results of our studies: First, we are both convinced 
that a new picture of the cognitive capabilities of fish has been 
emerging over recent years. Fish should no longer be considered 
simple-minded, inflexible “reflex machines”, but there is increasing 
awareness of their surprisingly complex cognitive competences. 
This picture is developing only now, and we are still in an early 
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phase of discovering the minds of fish and their fascinating cogni-
tive adaptations to the challenges of their diverse habitats. Second, 
we both believe that at least certain fish species, such as rainbow 
trout, salmon, perch, goldfish and zebrafish, possess the capacity 
to perceive pain. While the biologist has some minor reservations 
because of a few as-yet unanswered questions, the philosopher is 
more confident. Both, however, agree and are strongly convinced 
that the information and knowledge that is available from recent 
research convincingly argues in favour of the existence of pain 
perception in fish, and it is now up to those who oppose this 
opinion to provide the evidence for rejecting this conclusion. 
We are grateful to the ECNH for initiating this work, in particu-
lar for the decision to commission both a biological and a philo-
sophical study. We gratefully acknowledge the support received 
from the members of the ECNH and their willingness to take part 
in stimulating and helpful discussions on the topics of cognition, 
pain perception and consciousness in fish. 
We hope that these two reports will be of value for researchers 
and experts as well as for those who are professionally engaged 
with fish. We further hope that these reports will help to acquaint 
the interested public with this new perception of fish, and will 
provide a basis for ethical, political and legal discussions on the 
question of pain perception and welfare of fish. 
Bern and Zeglingen, July 2012
Helmut Segner, Markus Wild
1.  Introduction
The word pain commonly refers to a constellation of sensory, emo-
tional and conscious experiences, often connected with discomfort 
and stress. The International Association for the Study of Pain 
(IASP) defines pain as an “unpleasant, sensory and emotional 
experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage”. It 
is important to note that according to this definition, pain is not 
merely a sensory but also an emotional, subjective event. Indeed, 
in contrast to the more objective nature of other senses, pain is a 
highly individual and subjective experience (Dubin and Patapou-
tian 2010). The perception of pain involves discriminative-sensory 
and emotional-affective components, and as such it bears attributes 
both of a sensation (detection, signalling and recognizing stimuli) 
and of an emotion (Millan 1999, Perl 2007).
Pain can be provoked by noxious stimuli, for instance, by chem-
ical and physical injuries of the body surface or by pathologies of 
internal tissues. Pain is not the result of a single event but of 
a  series of events. It starts with sensing of noxious stimuli in  pe-
ripheral tissues (nociception), the transmission of the nociceptive 
signal to the brain, nociceptive processing in distinct areas of the 
brain, and, finally, the conversion of the nociceptive information 
into pain perception. Importantly, activity induced in the nocicep-
tors and nociceptive pathways by a noxious stimulus is not yet pain. 
For instance, a behavioural response of an animal to a noxious 
stimulus such as the withdrawal response does not necessarily  im-
plicate that the animal consciously perceives this stimulus as pain, 
but it may simply represent a non-conscious reflexive response. 
It is only the interpretation of the nociceptive signal in the brain 
under the influence of emotional and cognitive factors which turns 
noci ception into pain. 
Responses of organisms to pain include immediate reflexive 
behaviours such as withdrawal reactions or vocaling, but also high-
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er level responses such as avoidance learning. The translation of 
nociceptive signals into the experience of pain depends on a variety 
of factors, for instance, pain perception can be curtailed by stress, 
it can be exaceberated by anticipation, or already existing tissue 
damage can exaggerate the pain perception of additional noxious 
stimuli (hyperalgesia). There is a strong psychological component 
in pain perception, as evident, for instance, from the ability of 
placebo treatment to reduce pain (Wager et al. 2004), or from the 
fact that empathy for a person experiencing pain can induce pain 
sensations in the observer (Singer et al. 2004). 
Our perception of pain is strongly driven by our own experience, 
and the question arises what pain actually means when we trans-
fer this term to animals. The pain experienced by an animal will 
be qualitatively different to the pain sensation we experience. As 
pointed out by Rose (2007), most people would consider the use 
of the term “love” for describing the emotional situation of mating 
animals to be inappropriate – similarly, what we experience as pain 
is not the same what an animal experiences when it is exposed 
to a noxious stimulus. This does not implicate that an animal is 
not able to feel pain, but it highlights that we must exercise some 
caution when using the term “pain” for animals. Along this line 
of thinking, the present text, when referring to animal pain, does 
not stick to the definitions of human pain as given by the IASP, 
which is focused on the quality of human pain experience. When 
we talk of pain in fish, we deal with a qualitatively different form 
of pain experience, probably a more “primitive” (in an evolution-
ary sense) or “simple” form of pain (“einfacher Schmerz” in the 
study of Wild 2012). For this understanding of pain, the definition 
as suggested by Molleny (1997) may be more appropriate than the 
human-focused IASP definition: 
“Animal pain is an aversive, sensory experience representing awareness 
by the animal of damage or threat to the integrity of tissues. It changes 
the animal’s physiology and behaviour to reduce or avoid the damage, 
to reduce the likelihood of its recurrence, and to promote recovery.”
How can we know if an animal “feels” pain, how can we assess 
their subjective experiences when exposed to noxious stimuli 
(Bateson 1991)? In humans, assessment of pain experience often 
relies on verbal report of the individuals exposed to noxious stim-
uli, and this qualitative experience is then connected to quan-
tifiable measurement parameters such as neuroimaging signals. 
To assess the capability of non-human animals for pain expe-
rience, as verbal record is not possible, research strongly relies 
on a comparative approach, that is we evaluate similarities and 
continuities between structures and functions which are involved 
in pain perception in man to the corresponding structures and 
functions in animals. This includes analogies and / or homologies 
of neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and behavioural responses to 
painful stimuli. The interpretation of such data, however, can be 
equivocal; intuitively, it may still work for species being closely 
related to man such as primates, but it is getting increasingly 
difficult for evolutionary more distant species such as fish. Much 
of the controversial debate on the existence of pain perception 
in animals relates to this difficulty (Bateson 1991). 
The difficulties in assessing pain and understanding its nature 
are also reflected in the historical perspectives of pain (Brooks 
and Tracey 2005, Perl 2007). Aristotle (384–322 BC) classified 
pain as an emotion and this remained the dominating opinion for 
a long time. Originally, Galen (AD 130–201), and later Avicenna 
(AD 980–1037) and Descartes (AD 1596–1650), placed pain into 
the sphere of sensation, but a controversial discussion remained 
if pain is indeed an independent sensation with its own sense 
organs and pathways (specificity theory), or if pain sensation is 
the result of an intense activation of other sensory systems (in-
tensity, pattern and gate theories) (cf. Perl 2007). One important 
argument why pain was considered to be not a specific sensation 
on its own was the fact that it can be induced by different types 
of stimuli (mechanical, physical and chemical), a feature that 
is different to other senses and apparently argues against the 
existence of specific “pain receptors”. In the course of the 20 th 
century, however, an increasing number of anatomical studies 
provided evidence for the existence of a distinct class of afferent 
nerve fibres that selectively respond to tissue injury, irrespective 
if the tissue injury is caused by a chemical, physical or mechanical 
factor (Sherrington 1906, Burgess and Perl 1967). Subsequent 
electrophysiological studies showed that activity in these affer-
ent fibers correlates with pain behaviour and pain experience 
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 (e. g. Konietzny et al. 1981, Ochoa and Torebjörk 1983), thereby 
providing strong evidence that they act as “nociceptors”. 
Not only was the existence of nociceptors controversially dis-
cussed, but also the question where in the brain the pain sensa-
tion is generated. For a long time, it was believed that pain is the 
product of thalamic processes, discounting a contribution of the 
cerebral cortex (cf. Perl 2007). This view was based on the concep-
tion of the thalamus as a site of emotion processing. Also, studies 
showing that no change of pain sensation occurred in patients with 
cortex lesions argued against a role of the cortex in pain percep-
tion. Only late in the 20 th century, it was recognized that pain 
processing and perception strongly involve cortical regions. The 
current view, which has evolved over recent years, is that pain 
sensation does not result from the activity of a single brain region 
but is generated by the integrated action of a “pain matrix”, which 
consists of a dispersed network of cortical as well as sub-cortical 
brain regions (see chapter 2.3.1). 
A critical issue in the discussion on the existence of pain per-
ception in non-human animals is the question if animals are con-
scious organisms. In man, pain is defined as conscious, subjective 
experience. It was long believed that only man, but not animals, 
are conscious – an opinion which goes back to Descartes – and, 
in this line of thinking, animals are not capable of experiencing 
pain. Attitudes and perceptions towards animals, however, have 
changed, and the view of man as unique has been abandoned. It is 
now widely accepted that at least those animals which are closely 
related to us, such as primates in particular or mammals in general, 
are sentient, that is they possess positive and negative emotions. 
Particularly for sympathetic animals like cats or dogs, we readily 
believe that they suffer from injury and are able to experience 
some form of pain. The situation is different, however, if it comes 
to cold and slimy animals like fish; here, we are more reluctant 
to accept the idea that experience emotive states and are able to 
feel pain. 
The present work aims to critically review the available biologi-
cal evidence for or against nociception and pain perception in fish. 
Research over the last 10 to 20 years has created important new 
insights into the capability of fish to experience pain. For instance, 
one outcome of recent research with fish is the demonstration that 
they possess nociceptors – a fact that has been proven only during 
the last decade. What is controversially discussed until to date is 
the question, if fish are able for pain perception: while one group of 
scientists argues that fish can not feel pain since they lack certain 
neuroanatomical structures which in humans are associated with 
pain perception (Rose 2002, Arlinghaus et al. 2007), other scien-
tists claim that the neuroanatomical and physiological capacities of 
fish are sufficient to perceive at least some primitive form of pain 
(Oidtmann and Hoffmann 2001, Braithwaite 2010, Cottee 2012). 
The following text will start with a very short overview on no-
ciception and pain perception in man in order to provide some 
baseline information. The main part of this work will deal the 
question what the existing knowledge on fish neuroanatomy, neuro-
physiology and behaviour tells us on their capability to perceive 
pain and to act as conscious, sentient organisms. The discussion 
will be restricted to nociception and pain perception in bony fish 
(teleosts or, more specifically, actinopterygians), but will not in-
clude the more ancient fish groups, Agnatha and Chondrichthyes, 
because the available data base for these groups is too limited. 
Even among the 20,000 to 30,000 known teleostean species, in-
formation on nociception and pain processing is available for a 
negligibly small number of species only. Findings obtained from 
these few fish species probably represent principal properties of 
nociception and pain perception in actinopterygian fish in gener-
al, still one must be cautious in generalization and cross-species 
extrapolation.
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ception in fish. The discussion will focus on acute pain, neglecting 
other aspects of pain such as chronic pain or the modulation of 
pain experience by psychological factors, for instance, individual 
attitudes and beliefs.
2. Nociception and pain perception in man
Pain perception in man is a sensation that results from three major 
steps (Figure 1):
• peripheral nociception, that is the sensing of noxious stimuli in 
peripheral organs such as skin, viscera, etc.,
• processing of nociceptive information at the spinal cord level, 
and transmission to the brain,
• processing of the nociceptive information in the brain.
It is this processing of nociceptive message in the brain that turns 
the nociceptive signal into the sensation we perceive as “pain”. Pain 
arises from the integration of a sensory-discriminative component, 
which records intensity, location, and modality of the noxious stim-
uli, with an affective-cognitive component, which associates the 
nociceptive input with cognitive properties (e. g., attention, mem-
ory) and with emotional properties (e. g., fear, unpleasantness) 
(Millan 1999, Peyron et al. 2000). As formulated by Tracey (2005), 
pain is “an interpretation of the nociceptive input influenced by 
memories, emotional, pathological and cognitive factors”.
Perceiving pain leads to behavioural pain expression and (pro-
tective) responses. These reactions are governed both by auto-
matic processes (unintentional/reflexive, for instance, screaming, 
vocaling, withdrawal reflex) and controlled processes (intentional/
purposive, for instance, sequences of instrumental motor activ-
ity) (Craig et al. 2010). Neuro-anatomically, these reactions are 
anchored in the brainstem (e. g., reticular area, globus pallosa), in 
subcortical regions such as thalamus, as well as in the cortex (Rose 
2002, Braz et al. 2005). 
In the following, the three steps leading from nociception to 
pain perception will be discussed with respect to man. This is in-
tended to provide a basis for discussing nociception and pain per-
Figure 1: Schematic overview of key 
elements in pain perception:  
peripheral nociception, spinal cord 
processing and transmission, and 
brain processing
Brain:
nociceptive processing, 
pain perception
•	 cordical
•	 subcordical
Spinal cord:
nociceptive processing
and transmission
nociceptors
ascending  
nociceptive 
pathways
endogenous 
injury
exogenous 
noxius stimuli
nociceptive input
descending  
(faciliating/onhibitory) 
pathways
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2.1 Nociception: peripheral sensing of noxious stimuli
Both animals and plants have developed sensors to detect changes 
of the internal as well as external environment, as this is crucial 
to respond adaptively to the changes, and to survive, grow and 
reproduce under variable conditions of life. One particular sens-
ing process is nociception, which is the ability to detect damaging 
or potentially damaging (“noxious”) stimuli. The word is derived 
from the Latin nocere meaning “to hurt/harm”. It refers to the 
neural process of sensing, encoding and processing noxious stimuli. 
Importantly, nociception is not yet pain sensation.
The receptors which detect noxious stimuli are called nocicep-
tors. They are sensory afferent fibers which are sensitive to noxious 
stimuli. In the definition of the International Association for the 
Study of Pain (IASP), nociceptors are “receptors preferentially 
sensitive to noxious stimuli or to stimuli which would become 
noxious if prolonged”. The existence of functional nociceptors in 
man was demonstrated relatively late, more precisely, in the 1960s 
(Burgess and Pearl 1967). Their detection gave support to the the-
ory that pain is an independent sensation with its own sensors, a 
view that is in contrast to the intensity theory, which postulates 
that nociception is a matter of intensity and arises from intense 
activation of receptors that serve other sensations (cf. Perl 2007). 
Nociceptors are stimulated by chemical, physical and mechan-
ical stimuli. They are characterized by the following properties:
• threshold: nociceptors usually show a high threshold in respond-
ing to stimuli. This is in contrast to other sensors, but biologi-
cally it makes sense because otherwise even faint stimuli would 
be perceived to be noxious. For instance, while weak tactile 
(mechanical) stimulation of our skin is perceived as positive, 
only strong mechanical pressures will be perceived as painful;
• modality: the majority of (cutaneous) nociceptors, in contrast 
to most other sensors, are poylmodal, i. e. do not detect just one 
type of stimulus, either chemical, physical or mechanical, but 
can detect all three; 
• conduction velocity: nociceptors differ in the velocity by which 
they transmit the nociceptive signal (see below).
Nociceptors are best studied in the skin (and the subsequent de-
scription refers mainly to skin nociceptors) but they occur also in 
viscera, muscles, periost etc. Nociceptors of the Nervus trigeminus 
are responsible for nociception from face and teeth. Cutaneous 
nociceptors are pseudounipolar cells, with the cell body located in 
the dorsal root ganglion or in the trigeminal ganglion, from where 
they send a peripheral axon to innervate the skin, and a central 
axon to synapse to second-order neurons in the spinal cord or in 
Figure 2: Different forms of sensory  
terminals and different fibre types of 
cutaneous nociceptors. 
(Modified from Messlinger, 1997)
5
6
1 2
3
III (Aδ)
II (Aβ)
4
1. non-corpuscular endings
2. registration of action potential 
3. spinal ganglion
4. dorsal horn
5. Ruffini corpuscles
6. Paccini corpuscle
II Aβ, III Aδ, Abbreviations  
designate different fiber types (see text)
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the trigeminal subnucleus caudalis (Dubin and Patapoutian 2010). 
The peripheral axons branch into free un-encapsulated nerve end-
ings (Figure 1) that innervate distinct regions in skin and epidermis. 
They can be arranged in non-corpuscular or corpuscular endings. 
It is at these free nerve endings where the transduction of noxious 
stimuli into an electrical signal takes place. The transduction oc-
curs through depolarizing of the peripheral membrane, a process 
that involves a range of ion channelling receptor molecules (Bas-
baum et al. 2009, Belmonte et al. 2009, Dubin and Patapoutian 
2010). An example is provided by the TRPV1 receptor (capsaicin 
receptor) which transduces noxious chemical stimuli (capsaicin, 
contained in chilli pepper) – but also noxious heat stimuli – into an 
action potential of the nociceptor membrane. Another well-studied 
example of how a noxious stimulus is transduced into an action po-
tential is provided by the thermally gated Na+ K+ channels (Dubin 
and Patapoutian 2010).
Once stimulated, nociceptors transmit the action potential along 
the axon in the direction of the spinal cord. Transmission velocity 
correlates directly to the diameter of the axons and whether or 
not they are myelinated. The so-called C-fibers, which constitute 
the majority of cutaneous nociceptive afferents, are unmyelinated 
axons of small diameter (≤ 1µm), which are bundled in fascicles 
ensheathed by non-myelinating Schwann cells. These axons sup-
port conduction velocities of 0.4 to 1.5 m/s. In contrast, A-fibre 
nociceptors (mostly Aδ) are myelinated, thicker (2 µm) axons with 
conduction velocities of 5 to 30 m/s. The Aδ-fibers are responsible 
for the initial fast-onset pain, while the C-fibres are responsible 
for the deep, longer-lasting pain (St. John Smith and Lewin 2009, 
Dubin and Patapoutian 2010). The intensity of the noxious stimu-
lus is encoded in the train – not in the amplitude – of the impulses. 
Nociceptors can undergo sensitization, what means that their 
threshold can change after the initial stimulation (Witt and Grifin 
1962). This process is considered to be at least partly responsible 
for increased pain sensitivity of injured tissue (primary hyperal-
gesia).
The ability to detect damaging environmental forces is a very 
common, evolutionary conserved sensory trait of animal species 
(St. John Smith and Lewin 2009). Given the fundamental role 
nociception plays to protect animals from harmful impacts, the 
evolutionary early development of nociceptive systems is hardly 
surprising (Braithwaite 2010). Already bacteria show behavioural 
responses to mechanical stimuli. Although as unicellular organ-
isms they cannot possess nociceptors, they possess mechano-
sensitive ion channels, similar to those in the terminal endings of 
nociceptors. In the animal kingdom, the first appearance of nerv-
ous systems occurs within the phyla Cnidaria and Ctenophora. Al-
though they show a still fairly simple organization, they are already 
able of sensing electrical and mechanical stimuli. True nociceptors, 
finally, develop within the Bilateria, and here they were found in 
all groups studied to date (St. John Smith and Lewin 2009).
2.2  Processing of nociceptive information at the spinal cord level
Nociceptive primary afferents from the skin, i. e. the small diameter 
C-fibers and the medium diameter Aδ-fibers terminate primarily 
in the superficial laminae (I and II) of the dorsal horn of the spinal 
cord (Millan 2002, Todd 2010). There is evidence that peptidergic 
nociceptors, which express neuropeptides, target primarily projec-
tion neurons and interneurons of lamina I, while non-peptidergic 
nociceptors terminate primarily in lamina II. Collaterals of the 
primary afferents terminate in deeper layers (laminae V/VI). Also 
visceral nociceptors convey their information to the outer layers 
of the dorsal horn, while nociceptive information from face and 
teeth is transmitted through the branches of the Nervus trigemi-
nus. In the dorsal horn, the primary afferents stimulate numerous 
ascending projection neurons which relay the information to the 
brain. The principal neurotransmitter of the primary afferents is 
glutamate, what implicates that primary afferents have an excita-
tory effect on their postsynaptic targets.
The ascending neurons project to several brainstem and cortical 
regions, many of them being interconnected and thus receiving 
also indirect nociceptive inputs (see below). The main relay site 
of nociceptive information in the brain is the thalamus (Millan 
1999, Todd 2010). Neuroanatomy and organisation of ascending 
projection pathways in mammals are highly complex, as the ax-
ons originate from several laminae of the dorsal horn, and involve 
diverse axon types and neurotransmitters (for details see Millan 
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1999). The most prominent ascending projection which transmits 
nociceptive information from the dorsal horn to the brain is the 
contralateral tractus spinothalamicus. 
Importantly, the spinal dorsal horn is not simply a relay sta-
tion, but has a strong filtering and modulating effect on nocicep-
tive transmission (Millan 2002, Todd 2010). This is due to the 
activity of neuronal circuits in the dorsal horn: the primary affer-
ents are not only connected to the ascending neurons, but they 
have cross-connections with inhibitory and excitatory interneu-
rones in the laminae. In addition, descending pathways from the 
brain – mainly serotonergic, noradrenergic and GABA (gamma- 
aminobutyric acid) -ergic axons – exert inhibitory as well as 
facilitating effects on nociceptive transmission in the spinal cord. As 
a result, the intensity of the nociceptive input can be strongly modu-
lated at the spinal cord level (Millan 2002, Tracey and Mantyh 2007).
2.3 The human brain: from nociception to pain
Understanding of pain perception and its neural correlates 
depends to a large extent on the methodological possibilities avail-
able to study the relevant processes in the brain. Here, significant 
progress has been achieved since the advent of (non-invasive) neu-
roimaging techniques. These methodological approaches enabled 
to relate neural activity changes to subjective pain experience of 
humans (Brooks and Tracey 2005).
Importantly, according to current understanding of pain per-
ception, pain does not result from the activity of a single, particu-
lar part of the brain, but arises from the concerted activation of 
several brain regions (“pain matrix”– see below). Brain regions 
that have been reported to be involved in pain processing in man 
include cortical, subcortical and brainstem regions (Millan 1999, 
Price 2000, Braz et al. 2006, Baumgärtner 2010).
In the following, a very brief overview of brain anatomy will be 
given in order to introduce anatomical terms related to nociceptive 
and pain processing in the brain (see also Kardong 2006, and Fig-
ure 3). Based on anatomical, functional and ontogenetic criteria, the 
vertebrate brain can be subdivided into the following parts (from 
anterior to posterior):
1. Prosencepehalon (forebrain)
 •  Telencephalon (Cerebrum), with
   – Tractus olfactorii/olfactory bulbs
   – Cerebral hemispheres/cortical region
   – Corpus striatum, pallidum
   – Hippocampus
   – Ventricles 1 and 2
 •  Diencephalon, with
   – Thalamus
   – Hypothalamus
   – Pineal gland
   – Ventricle 3
2. Mesencephalon (midbrain)
 •  Mesencephalon, with
   – Optical lobe
   – Cranial nerves III and IV
3. Rhombencephalon (hindbrain)
 •  Metencephalon, with 
   – Cerebellum 
   – Pons
   – Periaqueductal gray
   – Ventricle 4
 •  Myelencephalon, with
   – Medulla oblongata
   – Reticular system (Formatio reticularis)
   – Cranial nerves V–XII
The telencephalon includes a subcortical and a cortical part, which 
builds from a pair of expanded lobes or cerebral hemispheres. Left 
and right hemispheres of the cerebrum are connected via commis-
sures, with the corpus callosum being one of the more prominent 
commissures. The outer layer of grey and white matter covering 
the telencephalic hemispheres is called pallium. In basal verte-
brates such as fish, the pallium forms a relatively simple three-lay-
ered structure. In higher vertebrates, it develops into the cerebral 
cortex with an increasingly complex structure. The evolutionary 
youngest development is the so-called neocortex of mammals, 
which is made up of six layers (I to VI). The neocortex is part 
of the overall cerebral cortex, along with the evolutionary older 
Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology22 23
archi- and palaeo cortex. In humans, the neocortex is involved in 
higher functions such as sensory perception (including pain), gen-
eration of purposive motor commands, spatial reasoning, conscious 
thought and language. The neocortex is folded to accomodate its 
increasing volume. The folds are called gyri, and the grooves in 
between are designated as sulci. The cortex is anatomically sub-
divided into frontal, temporal, parietal and occipital lobes, and it 
contains many subregions with distinct functions, e. g., the cingu-
late cortex which is located close to the corpus callosum, or the 
primary somatosensory cortex in the frontal lobe.
The diencephalon includes (i) the ventral hypothalamus, with a 
number of neurosecretory functions and intimate relationship to 
the hypophysis or pituitary land, (ii) the dorsal epithalamus, with 
the pineal gland which secretes melatonin, and (iii), the thalamus, 
which basically represents the lateral walls of the diencephalons. 
The diencephalon also houses the chiasma opticum.
The metencephalon contains as a prominent structure the 
cerebellum. This brain part is important for equilibrium, and it 
processes information pertaining to touch, vision, hearing, pro-
prioreception and motor information from higher centres. The 
cerebellum modifies, refines and monitors motor activity, but it 
does not initiate it. An important pathway of information exchange 
between cortex and cerebellum is the pons. Often, the midbrain 
structures cerebellum and pons, together with the medulla, are 
designated as brainstem; the brainstem connects the cerebellum 
with the spinal cord, and it controls autonomic functions of the 
peripheral nervous system.
The myelencephalon contains the nuclei of a number of cranial 
nerves, and the medulla oblongata, which operates primarily at the 
reflex level. Information arriving via ascendent projections is partly 
processed in the medulla, and, vice versa, efferent output to adjust 
visceral or reflexive motor activity is initiated here.
A brain component that is frequently mentioned in the context 
of pain perception is the limbic system. It is not an anatomically 
discrete region but represents a functional association between sev-
eral cortical and subcortical centers. There is no generally accepted 
definition which brain structures constitute the limbic system but 
most frequently the following structures are included: insular and 
cingulate cortex, thalamus, hypothalamus, hippocampus, amygda-
Figure 3: Schematic of ascending 
pathways, subcortical structures,  
and cerebral cortical structures 
involved in pain perception. 
(Modified from Price, 2000)
PAG periaque ductal gray,  
PB parabrachial nucleus of the  
dorsolateral pons,  
VMpo ventromedial part  
of the posterior nuclear complex  
of the thalamus,  
MDvc ventrocaudal part of the 
medial dorsal nucleus of the thalamus, 
VPL ventroposterior lateral  
nucleus of the thalamus,  
ACC anterior cingulate cortex,  
PCC posterior cingulate cortex,  
HT hypothalamus, 
S1 and S2 primary and secondary 
somatosensory cortical areas,  
PPC posterior parietal complex,  
SMA supplementary motor area, 
AMYG amygdala,  
PF prefrontal cortex.
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la and certain brainstem regions (Pessoa 2008). The limbic system 
is considered to be important for emotion and affect. For instance, 
the hypothalamus is connected to the autonomic nervous system 
and thereby influences emotions, the amygdala is active in genera-
tion of fear and aggression, or the cingulate gyrus is active during 
emotive states.
Nociceptive processing and pain perception involve cortical, 
subcortical and brain stem regions. Meta-analyses of results from 
neuroimaging studies identified those human brain regions that 
are most frequently active during acute pain experience (Peyron 
et al. 2000, Bingel et al. 2002, Apkarian et al. 2005): primary and 
secondary somatosensory cortices (SI and SII), insular cortex, an-
terior cingulated cortex, prefrontal cortex, thalamus, basal gan-
glia, cerebellum, amygdala, and hippocampus (see also Figure 3). 
Exactly these regions are also sensitive to pharmacologically in-
duced analgesia, what again supports their functional role in no-
ciceptive processing and pain perception (cf. Tracey and Mantyh 
2007). Importantly, the aforementioned list of brain regions is not 
restricted to the cortex, but includes subcortical areas, thalamus, 
hypothalamus, reticular formation of brain stem, ventrolateral me-
dulla, lateral parabrachial area, amygdala, caudate medulla, peri-
aqueductal grey matter, and pallidus/putamen. All these regions 
are targeted by ascending nociceptive pathways from the spinal 
cord (Millan 1999, Braz et al. 2006, Baumgärtner 2010). The sub-
cortical, nociception -processing regions provide both direct and 
indirect input to the following cortical regions: somatosensory cor-
tices (SI and SII), the insular cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, 
and the prefrontal cortex (Millan 1999, Tracey and Mantyh 2007, 
Baumgärtner 2010). The cortical regions do not only display a 
complex pattern of connections among themselves but they possess 
intensive reciprocal connections to subcortical regions and thala-
mus. Thus, the various brain regions being active in a situation of 
pain perception are intensively interconnected.
At the cortical level, the somatosensory regions SI and SII par-
ticipate in the sensory-discriminative aspects of pain thereby en-
abling to locate noxious stimuli – a property that is required for 
immediate defense and withdrawal behaviour (May 2007). Two 
cortical regions that are associated with pain affect are anterior 
insular cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (Price 2000, Weston 
2012). It is well documented that individuals experiencing emotion-
al feelings show activity in these two cortical areas, and individuals 
experiencing pain also display activity in the insular and cingulate 
cortices suggesting that nociceptive and affective information get 
connected in these regions (Vogt 2005, Craig 2009). The two corti-
cal areas are also part of the limbic system, which generally shows 
an intimate connection with the pain matrix, as all parts of the 
limbic system – which is central for emotion and affective states  – 
also participate in pain matrix (Peyron et al. 2000, Price 2000). 
Finally, both cingulate cortex and insular cortex are involved in 
imagined pain experience and in empathic pain, i. e. pain arising 
from observing another person receiving pain stimuli (Singer et 
al. 2004, Wager et al. 2004, May 2007).
The main relay station for the reception and processing of noci-
ceptive information en route to the cortex is the thalamus. It inter-
links with cortical and limbic structures and is involved in both the 
sensory- discriminative and affective-cognitive dimensions of pain 
(Millan 1999). Nociceptive neurons of the contralateral spinotha-
lamic tract ascend to specific medial nuclei of the thalamus, which 
then project to limbic cortical areas such as insular cortex, anterior 
cingulate cortex (Price 2000). Other ascending projections target so-
matosensory relay nuclei of the thalamus from where the information 
is transmitted to somatosensory cortices. Many ascending projections 
terminate in brain regions belonging to the limbic system (e. g., amyg-
dala, hypothalamus) but they also target brain regions such as globus 
pallidus which are involved in regulating motor function (Braz et al. 
2006). While the former (limbic) connection contributes to emotional 
component of pain, the latter connection contributes to the stereo-
typic motor behaviours that are usually evoked by noxious stimuli.
The brainstem regions are actively involved in processing and 
modulating nociceptive information. For instance, the brainstem 
is active in gating nociceptive signals to the cortex and it functions 
in descending inhibition from the brain to the dorsal horn (Tracey 
and Mantyh 2007). Additionally, the brain stem possesses a high 
density of opiod receptors which can further shape nociceptive 
signalling. This capacity to modulate nociceptive information both 
in the cortical direction and in the spinal cord direction points to 
the important role of the brainstem in affecting pain experience. 
For instance, the periaqueductal grey is central for generation of 
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The – at least partly artificial – distinction is an attempt to discrim-
inate between those elements of pain perception which respond 
primarily to stimulus intensity, from those parts which reflect pri-
marily the emotional side (“unpleasantness”) of the pain sensation. 
Support for the concept of an at least partial division of pain sensa-
tion into perceptions of different quality comes from clinical obser-
vations which show that selective lesions on the anterior cingulate 
cortex alleviate the affective component of pain, while lesions to 
SI/SII cortical regions affect the discriminative component of pain 
hyperalgesia (Tracey 2005). Also, it is at the level of the brainstem 
where nociceptive information can be integrated with arousal or 
autonomic processes, thereby linking nociception with overall 
homeo static regulation in the organism.
The large distributed network of interconnected cortical, sub-
cortical and brainstem regions that is accessed during nociceptive 
processing is commonly referred to as pain circuit or “pain matrix” 
(Figures 3 and 4). The existence of this matrix highlights that pain 
perception is not a matter of one specific brain region or brain part, 
but arises from a concerted network activity. Based on neuroana-
tomical, neurophysiological, pharmacological and neuroimaging 
data, the pain matrix is often subdivided into a lateral and medial 
pain systems, with both systems containing brainstem, subcorti-
cal as well as cortical components (Schnakers and Zasler 2007, 
Tracey and Mantyh 2007). The literature is not always consistent 
regarding what regions are to be included in the two systems, but 
generally the lateral pain system is considered to consist of the 
lateral thalamus, primary and secondary somatosensory cortex (SI 
and SII), parietal operculum and insula, while the medial system 
includes the medial thalamus, anterior cingulate cortex, prefrontal 
cortex, amygdala, hippocampus, hypothalamus, nucleus accum-
bens, and periaqueductal grey matter (i. e. mainly components of 
the “limbic system” that are known to be connected to affect). In 
addition, there exist connections of both systems to motor-related 
brain regions such as primary motor cortex, striatum and cerebel-
lum, as they are also part of the pain matrix (Peyron et al. 2000). 
It has been proposed that the lateral and medial pain systems 
have distinctive roles in producing pain perception: Activation 
of the lateral pain system is thought to be related to the sensory- 
discriminative aspects of pain, while the medial system is believed 
to participate primarily in the emotional-cognitive aspects (Peyron 
et al. 2000, Price 2000). Already at the thalamic level, a subdivi-
sion into a sensory and emotional-cognitive part appears to be 
realized, as specific thalamic nuclei are interconnected with the 
lateral system and other nuclei with the medial system (Millan 
1999, Perl 2007). Those thalamic nuclei which belong to the me-
dial system are known to play a role in affective and motivational 
reactions, while those of the lateral system are involved in soma-
tosensory functions.
Figure 4: Sensory, affective and  
cognitive processing of nociceptive 
input in the brain results in pain 
sensation
cortex
thalamus, brain stem, 
subcortex
spinal cord
nociceptors
sensory-
discriminative
Pain Matrix
affective-
cognitive
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(Foltz and White 1962, Ploner et al. 1999). Also neuron tracing 
and human brain imaging observations show neuronal connections 
and activity patterns that are consistent with discriminative and 
affective reactions in the lateral and medial systems, respectively. 
In addition to spatial differentiation, also temporal distinction  ex-
ists, as brain processing of nociceptive signals can occur both in 
parallel and in series (Price 2000).
The description above provides information which brain regions 
are involved in processing of nociceptive information, but it does not 
yet inform on their functions in generating the pain sensation. The 
different brain structures contribute to different dimensions of pain 
experience, although this does not mean that one region has one 
singular function, but the individual regions are integrated in com-
plex ways into the pain circuits. Also, while for some brain areas, for 
instance, for the periaqueductal gray matter, their function in pain 
perception is reasonably well understood, for other regions such as 
nucleus accumbens, we are only beginning to unravel their function 
in pain perception. The role of individual brain regions in pain pro-
cessing may be not uniform but heterogeneous, and the association 
between nociceptive signals and affective or cognitive informations 
can be complex. For instance, the anterior cingulate cortex possesses 
subregions which mediate different aspects of pain: fear-avoidance in 
the median cingulate cortex, unpleasantness in a more anterior sub-
region, and skeletomotor orientation in posterior subregions (Vogt 
2005, Pessoa 2008). In the anterior and mid regions, there exists 
overlap of the pain-activated sites with sites activated by emotion. 
In contrast, the posterior subregion, although showing a robust acti-
vation by nociceptive input shows no activation by emotional states; 
probably this subregion evokes skeletomotor body orientation to the 
noxious stimulus without affective content (Vogt 2005).
Notwithstanding the complexity of the pain matrix in the human 
brain, two common features are evident:
• the different functional pain components – sensory, affective, 
cognitive – cannot be seen as separate entities, but they are inti-
mately interlinked (Pessoa 2008, Craig 2009). For instance, the 
insular cortex is viewed as a relay station for sensory input into 
the limbic system and pain processing therein, and it conveys 
cognitive aspects of pain such as learning and memory (Pessoa 
2008). Neurons in the cingulate cortex stimulated by nocicep-
tive inputs are not able to recognize where in the body a noxious 
stimulus is located, but the insular cortex receives this informa-
tion indirectly via SI and SII somatosensory cortices, as well as 
via a loop going from SI and SII over subcortical amygdala and 
hippocampus back to cingulate cortex (Price 2000, Vogt 2005). 
Similarly, cognitive and emotional processes are interlinked, as 
cognition can trigger affective feelings, and affect can influence 
cognitive processes (Duncan and Barett 2007). For instance, 
prefrontal and parietal cortices are considered to have a central 
role in cognition but they also function in processing affective 
information. As put by Pessoa (2008):
“the affective processing of a stimulus is not independent of cog-
nitive factors such as attention: on the one hand, an item’s af-
fective significance appears to guide attention and enhance the 
processing of emotion-laden information, on the other hand, 
goal-directed attention and task context influence the neural fate 
of affectively significant items.” 
 Earlier, it has been argued that emotion, pain and cognitive con-
trol are functionally segregated in distinct regions of the brain 
or different subregions of a given brain area, however, recent 
observations encourage a fundamentally different view. The 
current understanding is that negative affect, pain, and cognitive 
control activate overlapping regions of the brain (Shackman et 
al. 2011).
• pain perception is not a matter of a single brain structure, e. g. 
the neocortex, but results from the integrated activity of the 
pain matrix which includes a boad array of brain regions from 
neocortex, subcortex, and brainstem. For instance, for the cin-
gulate cortex, anatomical studies reveal that the anterior subdi-
vision of the midcingulate cortex constitutes a hub where on the 
one hand pain/affect information can be linked to motor centres 
for expressing affect and executing goal-directed behaviour, and, 
on the other hand, substantial reciprocal connections exist with 
subcortical regions involved in affect and pain. Importantly, in-
formation is not only flowing from brainstem and subcortical 
regions to the cortex, but also the reverse direction, and many 
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pathways are ultimately converging on the same subcortical and 
limbic structures that are directly accessed by ascending spinal 
pathways (Price 2000). The few examples may illustrate that 
the generation of pain is anything else than a linear translation 
of a nociceptive signal into pain sensation, but results from a 
complex crosstalk between different regions in cortex, subcortex 
and brainstem. There is general agreement that the extent to 
which a pain stimulus is experienced as an affective or emotive 
state depends upon parallel and serial activities in different 
areas of the pain matrix (Tracey 2005). Nociceptive input is 
rapidly conveyed to multiple brain regions that collectively, as 
a circuit, are capable of processing the input. The fact that pain 
perception is an integrated brain activity is undisputed, only the 
relative importance of specific regions or pathways is subject of 
on going discussions. For instance, while Pessoa and Adolphs 
(2010, 2011) emphasize the importance of cortical activities, de 
Gelder et al. (2011) point to the essential role of subcortical re-
gions. Both groups, however, do not claim that pain perception 
takes place either in cortex or subcortex, but they emphasize 
the idea of the pain matrix.
3. Nociception and pain perception in fish
When studying pain in animals, a principal obstacle is that we 
have no direct access to their subjective experience and feelings. 
While we still can record the sensing of environmental stimuli, 
the feelings and emotions possibly associated with the sensing the 
stimuli have to be deduced from the presence and/or response 
of operational indicators of the emotional states. Typically, para-
meters which connect in an identifiable and defined way with pain 
perception in man are used as operational indicators, and these 
indicators are then studied in animals in order to infer from their 
presence or absence on the capability of pain perception in the 
animal under study (Bateson 1991, Rose 2007, Cottee 2012). Rose 
(2007) provides an illustrative example of this approach:
“Stress in man is characterized by an elevation of plasma cortisol 
levels. Thus, stress may be operationally defined as ‘elevation of 
plasma cortisol levels’. If an animal in a stressful situation shows 
an increase of plasma cortisol levels, we infer that this animal ex-
periences stress, in reference to what we know from man. In the 
case of cortisol and stress, it is easy to accept that ‘cortisol’ is a 
valid operational indicator of ‘stress’; however, it is much more 
problematic to identify a valid operational indicator for complex 
cognitive properties and emotive states such as ‘feeling of pain’.”
The problem may be exemplified by the controversial discussion 
on the role of the neocortex for an animal’s capability to sense 
pain. In man, the neocortex is of central importance for conscious 
pain perception. Therefore, presence or absence of the neocortex 
may be taken as indicator for the capability of pain perception in 
an animal.
Following this line of thinking, only mammals would be able 
to experience pain. Indeed, the fact that fish lack a neocortex (see 
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below) has been interpreted by several authors that fish are not 
capable of pain experience (Rose 2002, Arlinghaus et al. 2007). 
However, how valid is the indicator parameter “neocortex”? As 
discussed above, pain perception in man is not exclusively associ-
ated with the neocortex, but involves also other brain areas such as 
subcortical and brain stem regions, which have homologous regions 
in the fish brain. In addition, the absence of a neocortex structure 
is per se not sufficient to conclude on the absence of neocortex- 
associated functions, as non-mammalian species may possess func-
tional analogues executing these functions. A striking example 
are birds, which have no neocortex, but use a brain region called 
“Wulst” to perform functions that are neocortex-based in mammals. 
This example may illustrate the uncertainties concerning the va-
lidity of the operational indicators used to assess “pain perception” 
in non-human animals in general and in fish in particular. 
In the following, we will focus on those structural and functional 
parameters that have been and are used to assess the capability of 
fish for pain sensation: neuroanatomical, neurophysiological, and 
behavioural parameters. The discussion will start with the question 
if fish possess the capability for nociception, as this is the essential 
prerequisite for any form of pain perception. Although the ques-
tion may appear trivial, unequivocal evidence for the existence of 
nociception in teleost fish has been provided only rather recently. 
The next chapters will discuss:
• if there exists evidence for neuroanatomical basis of pain per 
ception in fish, 
• if there exists evidence for a neurophysiological basis of pain 
perception in fish, 
• if there exists evidence from behavioural studies that fish are 
able to experience pain. 
3.1 Nociception 
Neuroanatomically, pain perception in humans involves both 
peripheral nociceptors for sensing noxious stimuli –, and central 
neural structures – for the conversion of nociceptive signals into 
a consciously perceived emotive state. The latter process has its 
basis in the integrated activity of a dedicated system in the brain, 
the pain matrix. When evaluating the ability of fish to feel pain, 
the question arises if fish possess similar neuroanatomical equip-
ment for nociception and pain perception. More specifically, the 
questions are:
• do fish possess nociceptors?
• do fish possess central nervous structures and functions that are 
able to convert nociceptive information into pain sensation?
Here, we will discuss the available evidence for the existence of 
nociceptors in teleost fish. Until the early 2000s, there was no com-
prehensive information available whether teleost fish possess noci-
ceptors. There have been a few reports in the 1970s describing free 
nerve endings resembling nociceptors in the skin of fish (Whitear 
1971) but there was no functional data to support the interpretation 
that the observed structures do function as nociceptors. The first 
functional evidence for the presence of nociceptors in fish skin 
was provided by the studies of Sneddon (2002) and Sneddon et al. 
(2003a, b). The authors performed an anatomical and neurophys-
iological analysis of the trigeminal nerve in the head of rainbow 
trout, Oncorhynchus mykiss. Electron microscopical examination 
of the three branches of the trigeminal nerve revealed the pres-
ence of Aβ, Aδ and C-fibre types, i. e. the same fiber types known 
from mammalian nociceptors (see above). Interestingly, trout as a 
representative of bony fish had both myelinated and unmyelinated 
nerve fibers while the latter fibre type is absent in elasmobranch 
fish (St. John and Lewin 2009). The C-fibres comprised only 4 % 
of the total fibres, what is a considerably smaller percentage than 
in man (about 50 %); the biological significance of this difference 
is not clear (Sneddon 2002). In addition to the anatomical stud-
ies, Sneddon and co-workers also performed electrophysiological 
analyses. They applied three types of noxious stimuli: pressure, 
heat and chemical irritant (acetic acid). The noxious stimuli were 
able to trigger electrical firing of the trigeminal nociceptors, indi-
cating that the fibers with a nociceptor-like morphology do indeed 
function as nociceptors (Sneddon 2002, Sneddon et al. 2003a, b, 
Sneddon 2004). Various types of nociceptors were observed: mech-
anothermal nociceptors, mechanochemical nociceptors, polymodal 
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nociceptors as well as slow and fast adapting mechanical receptors 
(Sneddon et al. 2003a, Ashley et al. 2007). All receptor types ex-
cept mechanothermal receptors showed an increase in peak firing 
frequency with increased strength of stimulation, with evidence of 
response saturation at higher intensities (Ashley et al. 2007). The 
mechanical thresholds were higher in the polymodal than in the 
mechanical receptors, but generally they were very low compared 
to the thresholds of mechanoreceptors in the skin of mammals. 
Sneddon (2003a) speculated that this is a compensatory feature to 
the more easily damageable nature of fish skin. Thermal nocicep-
tors of trout showed a threshold that was about 10 °C lower than the 
thermal threshold of mammalian thermal nociceptors, and none 
of the tested receptors gave any response to water temperatures 
below 7 °C, indicating an absence of cold receptors (Ashley et al. 
2007). Both properties might be explained by the poikilothermic 
physio logy of fish. Overall, the results from this series of studies 
provide good evidence for the presence of nociception in teleoste-
an fish, and that the properties of the nociceptors are adapted to 
the specific biological properties of fish. This conclusion agrees 
with the conclusion from the EFSA Report (2009) which says 
that “there is good scientific evidence that fish possess the sensory 
equipment for detecting potentially painful stimuli”.
In mammals, the next step after peripheral nociception is 
the processing of the nociceptive signals at the spinal cord lev-
el (see above). Fish, in general, show an organization of major 
spinal pathways that is similar to mammals, including spino-tha-
lamic, spino-mesencephalic, spino-reticular and spino-limbic 
tracts (Chandroo et al. 2004a). This similarity suggests that spi-
nal tracts of fish function in carrying nociceptive signals to the 
brain, although to date actual experimental confirmation of this 
assumption is not available. What, however, has been shown is the 
presence of neuronal activities in the brain of fish after cutaneous 
noxious stimulation (Dunlop and Lamig 2005), indicating that 
peripheral nociceptive signals reach the brain. This observation 
provides indirect evidence for the functioning of the spinal cord 
of fish in nociceptive transmission.
3.2 Pain perception: neuroanatomical evidence 
3.2.1 The fish brain 
The brain anatomy of teleostean fish is rather diverse, reflecting 
their diverse habitats and modes of life (Butler and Hodos 1996, 
Kotrschal et al. 1998, Nieuwenhuys et al. 1998, Wulliman 1998). 
As emphasized by Rose (2002):
“Fish brains are not merely simpler versions of mammalian or am-
phibian or reptilian brains, but they can have highly diverse, unique 
adaptations due to their diverse evolutionary paths.”
For instance, electro-sensing mormyrid fish have a specific struc-
ture, the valucla, for the central processing of electric stimuli.
Independent of species variations, however, the fish brain com-
prises the principal elements of the vertebrate brain, as also found 
in human brain (see above): telencephalon (with the olfactory 
lobe), diencephalon, mesencephalon (with the optic tectum), me-
tencephalon (with the cerebellum), and myelencephalon (Figure 5). 
The teleost telencephalon receives input from the olfactory bulbs, 
but there are large areas of the pallium which are not devoted to 
olfactory input and are involved in other functions (see below). 
The telencephalon shows many reciprocal connections with the 
other parts of the brain. Advanced teleost fish like the percids tend 
to enlarge the midbrain and develop a prominent optic tectum in 
order to process the sensory information from the visual system 
as well as from the lateral line system, which provides the fish 
Figure 5: External morphology and the 
anatomical location of the fish brain.
(Modified from www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/452101/perch.)
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with detailed information on its three-dimensional environment. 
The hindbrain contains a prominent reticular formation includ-
ing giant Müller and Mauthner cells for very rapid avoidance and 
escape behaviours. The size of fish brains relative to body size is 
much smaller than it is the case for human brain (Huntingford et 
al. 2006).
A prominent difference between mammalian and fish brains 
exists with respect to the forebrain, particularly the telencephalon 
or cerebrum (Figure 6). The difference is expressed both with 
respect to the overall size of the forebrain and with respect to its 
surface layer, the pallium or cortex.
Generally, brain evolution within vertebrates must not be seen as a 
linear development, from the most simple brains in fish to the most 
advanced brains in mammals. Instead, brain evolution within ver-
tebrates has taken divergent routes, with one route moving towards 
bony fish, one towards birds and one towards mammals (Figure 7).
Figure 6: Comparison of brain anat-
omy across vertebrate classes. While 
the fish brain is dominated  
by telencephalum/cerebrum, optic 
lobe and cerebellum, the human  
brain is dominated by the neocortex.
(Modified from www.solarnavigator.
net/human-brain.htm)
Human
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Figure 7: Routs of brain develop-
ment within the class of vertebrates, 
illustrated for forebrain, cerebrum, 
cerebellum, and optic tectum. 
(Modified from Kardong, 2006)
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3.2.2 Neuroanatomical correlates of pain perception
Pain perception in man has its neural correlate in the pain matrix 
which comprises brain stem, thalamus, subcortical as well as ne-
ocortical areas. While the neocortex is absent in teloest fish, the 
brainstem regions and the thalamus are present. The situation is 
less clear with respect to the subcortical components of the pain 
matrix which have their origin in the telencephalon such as amyg-
dala and hippocampus. Earlier theories on the evolution of the 
cerebrum in vertebrates held that new regions gradually emerged 
out of pre-existing regions (Kardong 2006). Along this line, the 
neocortex was understood as a “neostructure” which evolutionary 
developed from a pallial archistructure. Meanwhile, a revised view 
of cerebral evolution in vertebrates is established which under-
stands the evolution of the vertebrate forebrain not as a stepwise, 
linear process, but as a divergent differentiation from a common 
ancestral anatomy. That basal structure of the vertebrate cerebrum 
comprises a pallium with medial, dorsal and lateral divisions, and 
a subpallium with striatum, septum and pallidum (Northcutt 1995, 
Kardong 2006, Medina and Abellan 2009). In teleosts, the palli-
um (but not the subpallium) becomes everted and swings outward 
involving re-arrangement of pallial areas (Northcutt 2008), while 
in all other vertebrates, it becomes inverted, with the medial pal-
lium and septum rolling inward and the lateral and dorsal walls 
inverting outward (Figure 8). Compared to the brains of the other 
vertebrates, the fish pallium, therefore, can be considered to be 
inside-out.
Among the tetrapods, the pallial (cortical) regions undergo di-
verse evolutionary developments, which involve not only an increase 
in size but also a thickening and differentiation into layers. In rep-
tiles, the lateral pallium gets hypertrophied and develops into the 
dorsal ventricular ridge which dominates the cerebral hemispheres. 
In birds, this dorsal ventricular ridge expands further and forms the 
so called Wulst, a region that has a high capacity for processing of 
visual information. In mammals, it is the dorsal pallium that expe-
riences a tremendous evolution and gives rise to the neocortex. The 
medial pallium, together with parts of the lateral pallium forms the 
hippocampus of tetrapods. The subpallium contributes to basal 
ganglia, caudate nucleus, putamen and amygdale of tetrapods.
Figure 8: Development of the pallium 
in actinopterygian vertebrates  
(fin-rayed fish, including teleosts)  
and in non-actinopterygian  
vertebrates (including tetrapods).  
In teleosts, the pallium (but not the 
subpallium) becomes everted and 
swings outward involving rearrange-
ment of pallial areas (Northcutt 
2008), while in the other vertebrates, 
it becomes inverted, with the  
medial pallium and septum rolling  
inward and the lateral and dorsal 
walls inverting outward. These  
differences complicate the recogni-
tion of homologies.
P1, P2, and P3 correspond to the three 
main subdivisions of the pallium. 
(Modified from Broglio et al., 2003)
1. Dorsal pallium
2. Lateral pallium
3. Medial pallium
4. Septum
5. Striatum
6. Accumbens
7.  Area dorsalis telencephali  
pars dorsalis
8.  Area dorsalis telencephali  
pars medialis
9.  Area dorsalis telencephali  
lateralis pars dorsalis
10.  Area dorsalis telenecephali  
pars centralis
11.  Area ventralis telenecephali  
pars dorsalis
12.  Area dorsalis telencephali  
lateralis pars ventralis
13.  Area ventralis telenecephali  
pars ventralis
Non-Actinopterygians
Actinopterygians
Evagination
Eversion
Neutral 
tube
 P1
 P2
 P3
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For teleost fish, given the everse instead of inverse development 
of the pallial regions (see above), the neuroanatomical and devel-
opmental evaluation of homologies of pallium and subpallium to 
the cerebral brain regions of tetrapod vertebrates is complicated 
(Moreno and Gonzalez 2007, Northcutt 2008). Instead, a more 
promising approach may be to compare functional analogies bet-
ween the fish and mammalian cerebrum. While originally it was 
thought that the primary role of the teleostean cerebrum is the 
processing of olfactory input, it is now clear that the function of 
the teleost cerebrum goes clearly beyond that aspect. The teleost 
cerebrum has developed into a highly differentiated structure be-
ing essential for the processing of diverse sensory information and 
possibly also affective information. Research over the last decade 
has demonstrated remarkable cognitive, learning and memory 
capa bilities of fish, and it is the cerebrum which appears to be 
the major neural correlate to these capabilities (cf. Chandroo et 
al. 2004a, Braithwaite 2010): pallial and sub-pallial regions of the 
teleost cerebrum show neural connections to other brain areas 
which resemble those in higher vertebrates (Butler and Hodar 
1996, Nieuwenhuys et al. 1998), they are involved in processing 
of somatosensory, gustatory, visual, acoustic and other sensory 
modalities, they mediate complex behaviours and integrative func-
tions such as avoidance learning, spatial learning, general arousal 
and social behaviour, and they are central for motivation and emo-
tional learning as well as memory. The lateral pallium, for instance, 
is crucial for spatial learning, while the medial pallium is essential 
for emotional learning and related processes, such as avoidance 
learning (Portavella et al. 2004, Broglio et al. 2005, Vargas et al. 
2009). Fish with lateral pallium lesions show severe and permanent 
deficits in identifying a familiar place, in finding and implementing 
new routes or in memorizing known routes (Rodriguez et al. 2002, 
Broglio et al. 2010, Duran et al. 2010). Spatial learning results in 
increased activity of the lateral pallium and removal of this brain 
region significantly impairs spatial learning capability (Rodriguez 
et al. 2002). Surgical removal of other pallial areas remained with-
out effect on spatial learning and memory of fish (Broglio et al. 
2010). Lesions in the medial pallium have an effect on emotional 
learning of fish. For instance, both Broglio et al. (2005) and Porta-
vella et al. (2002) observed that medial lesion impaired acquisition 
and retention of conditioned avoidance response in learning exper-
iments. These observations suggest that lateral and medial pallium 
have similar involvements in emotional and spatial learning as do 
hippocampus and amygdala of tetrapods. The tetrapod amygdala, 
in particular, is known to play a major role in fear and fear re-
sponses (LeDoux 1996), and in fact, lesions to teleost medial and 
lateral pallium disrupt fear-related behaviour (Broglio et al. 2005, 
Cottee 2012). Observations as exemplified above suggest homo-
logy of lateral, medial and dorsal pallium of fish to the subcortical 
regions, hippocampus and amygdala, of tetra pods (Broglio et al. 
2005, Braithwaite and Boulcott 2007, Vargas et al. 2009). It also 
has been proposed that the dorsal pallium is homologous to the 
mammalian (neo)cortex, for instance, due to the nerve connec-
tions with other brain areas which are similar to tetrapods (Ech-
teler and Saidel 1981), or because of homologies in genetic markers 
between dorsal pallium and mammalian neocortex (Wullimann 
and Müller 2004). Overall, however, the available evidence on a 
neocortex homologue in fish remains weak.
With respect to pain perception, the absence of a neocortex in 
fish has given rise to a controversial discussion on the capability 
of fish to feel pain. Based on this lack of higher cortical centres 
in the fish brain it has been argued that they may not be able to 
experience pain. This has been formulated by Rose (2002) in his 
influential article on pain perception of fish. Rose (2002, 2007) 
argues as follows:
“Pain perception is a conscious experience, and since consciousness 
is located – at least partly (see below) – in the neocortex, animals 
without neocortex do not possess pain perception. This implicates 
that fish, as they have no neocortex, are not capable of pain per-
ception.”
While this line of arguing is consistent in itself, the critical ques-
tion is if pain perception depends indeed that exclusively on the 
neocortex as claimed by Rose (2002) and others. Two alternative 
scenarios might be possible:
• could a (simple) pain perception arise from the activity of 
non-neocortical elements of the pain matrix, such as subcortical 
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regions, thalamus, brain stem? Could it be that the integrated 
action of these regions are sufficient to generate a “simple” pain 
sensation? Is the fact that pain perception in man is not an 
exclusive function of the cortex, but arises from the integrat-
ed activity of the pain matrix involving neocortical as well as 
non-neocortical regions supportive to such an interpretation? 
This leads also to the question on the evolution of pain percep-
tion: Has pain evolved only with the advent of the neocortex, 
with zero perception before presence of the neocortex, but full 
pain perception once the neocortex has evolved? Or was there a 
more gradual evolution of pain-related emotions and sensations, 
starting as a simple pain experience mediated by phylogeneti-
cally older brain regions?
• the neocortex is a particular evolutionary feature of the mam-
malian vertebrates. Other vertebrate classes have taken differ-
ent routes of brain evolution. Could it be that those vertebrate 
classes which possess no neocortex utilize other brain areas 
for functions which in mammals are executed by the neocortex 
(Chandroo et al. 2004a, Huntingford et al. 2006, EFSA 2009)?
The generation of pain sensation in the human brain involves a 
complex pain matrix, which comprises not only cortical areas but 
also subcortical and brainstem regions, or, as formulated by Craig 
(2009):
“The anterior cingulate cortex certainly does not operate auton-
omously.”
While Rose does not negate this fact, his view is that the subcorti-
cal areas alone, in the absence of the higher integrative system such 
as the neocortex, are not able to generate pain sensation. Accord-
ing to Rose (2002), brainstem and subcortical regions may be able 
to modulate perceptive processes in the cortex, but they cannot 
perform the perceptive process alone, without cortex. Rose (2002) 
supports his view from observations on humans with cerebral cor-
tex destruction or congenital cortex deficits. These persons are 
believed to be in a vegetative state in which all conscious awareness 
of environmental stimuli is abolished. Importantly, these persons 
still show behavioural responses to pain such as withdrawal reac-
tion or facial expressions. Since they have no neocortex function, 
Rose (2002) considers these responses as reflexive, stereotyped 
behaviours. However, this interpretation is partly in conflict to 
findings from patients with frontal lobotomy or cingulotoma. Un-
til the 1950s, this surgery was sometimes done with patients who 
suffered from chronic pain or depression. Indeed, removal of the 
frontal cortex or the cingulate cortex was able to remove chronic 
pain and depression, under retainment of the general intelligence 
of the patients. However, they lost emotional depth and feeling 
(Hurt and Ballantine 1974). The patients retained normal pain re-
flexes, they were aware of the pain, but they did not experience the 
emotional feeling of pain, the reaction was entirely in the present, 
and they seemed to have lost fear of the pain (Freeman and Watts 
1950). Obviously, removing the frontal cortex does not complete-
ly eliminate pain perception but eliminates certain qualities of 
pain perception. This interpretation is supported by the findings 
of Schnakers and Zasler (2007). These authors measured neuronal 
activities in patients with no functional cortex. Upon nociceptive 
stimulation, neural activities in the subcortical regions of decor-
ticate patients were not zero, but there were still rudimentary ac-
tivities on-going. Patients with a minimally functional neocortex 
showed brain activation patterns which were similar to brain ac-
tivation patterns of control subjects. Schnakers and Zasler (2007) 
interpret these observations not as indication that pain perception 
is impossible without neocortex, as claimed by Rose (2002), but 
their conclusion is that full pain perception depends on the inter-
action between cortical and subcortical regions. Also Duncan and 
Barett (2007) emphasize that pain perception in man involves the 
integrated activity of multiple regions from neocortex, subcortex 
and brainstem, and that pain perception, similar to many complex 
experiences, may emerge from the flow and integration of infor-
mation among several brain areas rather than from activation of 
one specific part of the brain. This agrees well with common un-
derstanding in the recent literature is that there is no single brain 
area which can be designated specifically to be responsible for 
pain perception, but that this property is widely distributed in the 
brain, and arises from the interplay between the various regions. 
What does the importance of interactions between brain areas 
for pain perception mean with respect to pain perception in animal 
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brains without neocortex? Is pain sensation completely abolished 
in species without neocortex, or is there a simple pain sensation, 
mediated by the non-neocortical elements of the pain matrix? As 
discussed above (Freeman and Watts 1950, Hurt and Ballantyne 
1974, Schnakers and Zasler 2007), patients with a non-functional 
cortex appear to have not zero pain perception – as claimed by 
Rose (2002) –, but they seem to have a limited pain perception, ap-
parently experiencing pain in a different quality of pain compared 
to patients with functional cortex. Further evidence for subcorti-
cal pain perception comes, for instance, from studies on children 
suffering hydranencephaly: Despite total or near-total absence of 
the neocortex, these children possess discriminative awareness of 
environmental stimuli, and they respond to noxious stimulation 
not in a merely reflexive but in purposeful way (Shewmon et al. 
1999, Schnakers and Zasler 2007). Vegetative state patients gener-
ate only an incomplete brain activation pattern upon nociceptive 
stimulation; however, it remains unclear if this means absent or 
incomplete pain perception (Schnakers and Zasler 2007). In this 
context, it is an interesting observation that loss of pain perception 
caused by brain lesions occurs only if the lesion is located in the 
thalamus, not in the cerebral cortex (what gave rise to the earlier 
belief that pain is the product of a thalamic mechanism; Perl 2007).
Another important question is to what extent findings on the 
role of cortex and subcortex in pain perception of man can be ex-
trapolated to pain perception of fish. The human brain has evolved 
as a functional unit involving both neocortical and non-neocortical 
components. Taking the neocortex out of this evolutionary shaped 
unit will necessarily result in a loss of function, as the system is 
designed to function as a whole, and not in separate parts (this 
may be an explanation why surgical lesions to specific brain areas 
often failed to relief pain). The situation is different with avian or 
piscine brains, which have evolved cognitive and affective capac-
ities in the absence of the neocortex. They may perform similar 
functions – albeit in a different quality – with alternative brain 
areas. Rose (2002) has addressed this argument and rejected it on 
the following grounds:
“Fish brains are understood well enough to make it highly implau-
sible that there are alternate, functionally uncommitted systems.” 
It is indeed plausible that the fish brain has no alternate region 
which could substitute for the human cortex, but this is not the 
question; the question is whether fish possess brain areas that are 
capable of linking a nociceptive signal with affect and cognition, 
thereby moving it beyond a merely reflexive, stereotypic level. In 
this context, Cottee (2012) provides an illustrative example:
“Imagine if you will be a fish stating to humans: ‘I have fins. If I am 
missing my fins, I can no longer swim. Fins are therefore essential 
for swimming. Humans do not possess fins. Therefore, humans 
cannot swim.’”
Of course, man is not able of the elegant and efficient swimming 
like fish, but man is still able of some simple form of swimming, 
even in the absence of the functional correlate for fish swimming, 
i. e. fins. The bias in this simple example is immediately evident, 
and although it cannot be directly extrapolated to the cortex/
pain issue, it is still worthy to think over potential flaws in that 
discussion.
How cautious one has to be in concluding from the presence or 
absence of specific neuroanatomical structures on the presence or 
absence of neural functions is exemplified by the recent change of 
our understanding of the functional properties of bird brains. Sev-
eral bird species display behaviour reminiscent of the sophisticated 
levels of cognition and higher levels of consciousness which are 
usually associated with mammals, including the ability to fashion 
tools and to learn vocal sequences (Butler and Cotterill 2006). At 
the same time, however, birds and mammals show a marked dis-
similarity in the dorsal pallium regions of the brain. While both 
birds and mammals possess a hippocampus originating from the 
lateral and medial pallium, the remaining, largest part of the palli-
um forms the neocortex in mammals and the so-called “Wulst” in 
birds. The significant difference of brain structure between the two 
taxa implicates that the two vertebrate classes apparently achieve 
similar cognitive and perceptive capabilities despite clear differ-
ences in neuroanatomy. Many functions, for which in mammals 
the neural substrate is the neocortex, are mediated by the Wulst 
in birds (Medina and Reiner 2000, EFSA 2009). Recent research 
has revolutionized the understanding of the avian brain neuro-
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anatomy and the homologies to the mammalian brain (Jarvis et 
al. 2005), and the lesson learned from this development is that we 
need to be very cautious in extrapolating from brain structures 
and associated functions in man to other vertebrates. Apparently, 
the same function can be served by different brain structures in 
different vertebrate groups (EFSA 2009). As outlined by Butler 
and Cotterill (2006), similarity of neural features of two vertebrate 
groups is not primarily a matter of similarity in brain structure, but 
of similarity in neural circuits (Butler and Cotterill 2006).
This brings us back to the question on the affective-cognitive 
capabilities of the fish brain. In chapter 3.4, several examples of 
emotional and cognitive learning in fish will be provided. Fish 
are able to perform a number of functions which in the human 
brain are processed – at least partly – in the neocortex. Bshary et 
al. (2002) provide examples of cognitive phenomena of fish, par-
ticularly in their social and environmental relationships, which in 
mammals are considered to be functions of the neocortex. As fish 
never evolved a neocortex, obviously other brain regions must ex-
ecute these cognitive functions. Like the mammalian cortex, the 
fish pallium appears to have a highly developed capability for pro-
cessing of sensory information: it is intensively interconnected with 
other brain areas such as mesencephalon and dienecehalon (Rink 
and Wullimann 2004), it is active after noxious stimulation (Dun-
lop and Laming 2005), and it contains structures which appear to 
be homologous to the mammalian amygdala and hippocampus 
(Portavella et al. 2002, 2004). Fish also possess a hypothalamus 
which is involved in functions such as sensual and social behaviour, 
and it integrates signals originating from those telencephalic re-
gions which have been implicated in fear responses (Chandroo et 
al. 2004a). All this is not to say that fish have the same cognitive 
capabilities as primates, but both the behavioural and the neuro-
anatomical observations point to continuities in brain functions 
and of neural correlates of emotive and mental states throughout 
vertebrate evolution, rather than drawing a sharp line between pre- 
and post-neocortex vertebrates. Another example of evolutionary 
continuity in the development of the cognitive vertebrate brain is 
indicated from the manifestation of cerebral lateralization through 
all vertebrate classes (Vallortigara 2000). There is now an increas-
ing body of data from studies in humans and animals that point to 
continuity of cognitive and emotion processing and its evolutionary 
role in shaping adaptive behaviour (Tamietto and de Gelder 2010). 
The principal question underlying them of the discussion above 
is the question how animals assign biological value to a stimulus: 
Animals are able to decide which stimuli are “good” and which 
ones are “bad”, they are able to learn on this, to approach the 
good ones and avoid the bad ones, keep memory on them, etc. 
These processes depend on specific neural correlates. The discus-
sion above indicates that different animal taxa may use different 
neuroanatomical structures for one and the same task. Even for 
mammals, where pain sensation is based on neural circuits be-
tween subcortical and neocortical regions, it is not yet fully un-
derstood how the neocortex interprets subcortical input, and how 
much circuitry between the various areas is needed to feel pain. 
Therefore, an equation “no neocortex = no pain perception” may be 
too simplified and may not adequately reflect the complex process-
es through which nociceptive signals are converted into perceived 
pain in the vertebrate brain.
3.3 Pain perception: neurophysiological evidence
The previous chapter discussed evidence for or against pain per-
ception in fish as derived from neuroanatomical features. This 
chapter will discuss available information on physiological prop-
erties of the fish brain which may shed light on the capability of 
fish for pain perception.
Neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies have been in-
tensively applied in studies with mammals to reveal changes in 
the functional state of brain after nociceptive stimulation. This 
type of studies showed, for instance, increased neuronal activi-
ty in areas such as anterior cingulate cortex when human volun-
teers were subjected to unpleasant noxious stimuli like tonic cold 
(Kwan et al. 2000). Comparable studies with fish are very rare 
to absent, probably not only because of technical difficulties but 
also because of difficulties in interpretation. If, for instance, an 
electrophysiological response is observed in a specific brain area 
of the fish, how can be proved that this does not represent noci-
ception but pain perception? As pointed out by Rose (2007), the 
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demonstration of physiological responses in certain brain areas in 
response to noxious stimuli is no evidence of pain, but may sim-
ply represent nociceptive responses. Dunlop and Laming (2005) 
subjected trout and goldfish to mechanoceptive and nociceptive 
stimuli, and recorded electrophysiological responses in the brain. 
Activity was found not only in brainstem and spinal cord regions 
(which are considered to be the key players in reflexive responses 
to nociceptive stimuli – see Rose 2002), but also in the forebrain, 
i. e. that brain region where higher cognitive centres are located. 
Also Nordgreen et al. (2007) found that electric stimulation of the 
tail of Atlantic salmon, Salmo salar, led to neuronal activity in 
the telencephalon. Similarly, Reilly et al. (2008) who studied gene 
expression in different brain areas of fish exposed to nociceptive 
stimuli observed gene induction responses in the telencepehalon. 
These findings suggest that the neural response of fish to painful 
stimuli is not confined to the lower brain centres of mid- and hind-
brain, but extends to the telencephalon. Since the telencephalon is 
central to learning and memory, nociceptive processing in this part 
of the brain may indicate – but is not yet a prove! – that the neuro-
physiological response of fish to nociceptive signals goes beyond a 
simple reflexive response but may process the external stimuli at a 
cognitive and emotional level (Nordgreen et al. 2007). A promising 
next step has been taken by Nordgreen et al. (2007) who treated 
salmon with electric stimuli of different intensities, which they 
considered as putatively non-noxious (low intensity) and putatively 
noxious (high intensity). The two treatments evoked significantly 
different electric potentials in the telencephalon. While this finding 
indicates that salmon distinguish between the putatively noxious 
and putati vely non-noxious stimuli, it remains unclear what this 
difference means with respect to pain perception.
The fish brain possesses neurotransmitters, which in man are 
involved in emotional states including pain, for instance, dopa-
mine. Dopamine has important functions in motivation and reward 
behaviour. Interestingly, administration of dopaminergic agonists 
like amphetamine evokes reward behaviour not only in mammals 
but also in fish (Chandroo et al. 2004a), possibly indicating some 
capability of fish to experience emotions. Also substance P, which 
in mammals is involved in pain mediation as well as in reward pro-
cesses, affects the reward behaviour of fish (Mattioli et al. 1995).
Much emphasis in studying neurophysiological aspects of the noci-
ception and pain in fish was given to the question if fish possess an 
endogenous analgesia system. Vertebrates can endogenously con-
trol transmission of nociceptive signals and reduce pain sensation 
by means of opiod peptides, enkephalins and the corresponding 
opiod receptors. In man, neurons using opiod peptides as neuro-
transmitters are located, for instance, in ascending and descending 
projections of the spinal cord and in the brain stem (Millan 1999); 
and relatively high concentrations of opiod receptors are found 
in the higher association centres as well as in components of the 
limbic system including the amygdala (Zubietta et al. 2001). There 
exists good evidence that fish, like other vertebrates, possess opi-
od receptors, endogenous opiods and enkephalins. First evidence 
for the presence of endogenous opioids and opiod receptors be-
came available in the late 1980s (Vallarino 1985, Rosenblum and 
Callard 1988, McDonald and Dores 1991). Meanwhile it is well 
established that fish possess all four main opiod receptor types 
(delta, kappa, mu and NOP) found in vertebrates (Weber 2011), 
that the protein structure of piscine opiod receptors is very similar 
to that of mammalian opioid receptors, and that the distribution of 
endogenous opioids and enkephalins in the fish brain is similar to 
that in mammalian brains (EFSA 2009). Importantly, expression 
of opiod receptors in the fish brain is not confined to brainstem, 
but, comparable to mammals, they are also found in the telecen-
phalon of fish, i. e. they can potentially interfere with higher level 
processing of sensory and affective information (Gonzalez-Nunez 
and Rodriguez 2009). Behavioural studies revealed that the opiod 
system in fish indeed has an anal gesic function, since administra-
tion of analgesic substances such as morphine or opiate antagonists 
such as naloxone to fish results in reduced behavioural response 
to painful stimuli (Ehrensing and Michell 1982, Chervova 1997, 
Sneddon 2003a, b, Nordgreen et al. 2009, Mettam et al. 2011). Mo-
lecular, biochemical and pharmacological properties of fish opiod 
receptors are fundamentally similar to their mammalian coun-
terparts. Consequently, fish species like zebrafish are meanwhile 
used as model organisms to study opiod activity and to develop 
new analgesic and psychoactive drugs for man (Gonzalez-Nunez 
and Rodriguez 2009). Again, however, the presence of opioid sys-
tem in fish is not yet sufficient to conclude on the presence of pain 
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perception in fish. This system may simply serve to suppress noci-
ceptive responses, although one may wonder if this would require 
an apparently elaborated analgesic system.
Similarities between fish and mammals extend beyond analgesia. 
Fish species such as zebrafish are also used as model to investigate 
the hedonic effects of addictive drugs as well as the mechanisms of 
dependence from opiate drugs (Darland and Dowling 2001, Guo 
2004, Lau et al. 2006, Ninkovic and Bally-Cuif 2006). Darland 
and Dowling (2001) demonstrated a genetic basis for the response 
of zebrafish to cocaine. They showed that zebrafish exhibit strong 
or weak cocaine-induced conditioned place preference behaviour 
depending on their genetic make-up of the fish. These differences 
in cocaine sensitivity of behavioural preferences were associat-
ed with differences in stress sensitivity and novelty response, two 
para meters which in rats are associated with the dopamine system, 
reward behaviour and amphetamine self-administration. Selective 
advantages of the ability to decide for pleasure and to avoid pain 
are obvious, and observations like the aforementioned ones raise 
the question on how gradually or abruptly this ability developed 
during vertebrate evolution.
3.4 Pain perception: behavioural evidence
3.4.1 Fish cognition
After having discussed neuroanatomical and neurophysiological 
evidence for or against the capability of fish to perceive pain, this 
chapter will address the evidence available from behavioural stud-
ies. Animals can respond behaviourally to environmental signals 
in a rather inflexible, stereotypic way, or in a flexible way, what can 
increase the adaptive value of the response. To be able to respond 
in a flexible way, the animal needs advanced capabilities to process 
the information, memorize it, connect it with other information 
and/or with emotion, and to deduce logical decisions from these 
cognitive processes. Behavioural studies can provide insight into 
the mental states of animals, that is their capability to process 
information input and to annotate it emotionally (Bateson 1991, 
Rose 2002, Chandroo 2004a, b, Broom 2007, Cottee 2012). The 
area of behavioural research which deals with animal minds is also 
designated as cognitive ethology (Bekoff 2007, Wild 2012). Inti-
mately related to the study of animal mental states is the question 
of animal consciousness, however, this aspect will be discussed in 
a separate chapter.
Concerning cognitive capabilities of fish, conventional wisdom 
portrays fish as simple-minded, instinct-driven organisms with 
“a three-second-memory” (Laland et al. 2003, Salas et al. 2006, 
Braithwaite 2010), showing mainly reflexive behaviour and little 
cognitive capabilities (basically a behaviouristic idea – see also 
Wild 2012). Recent research has challenged this view and has 
demonstrated profound capabilities of fish for cognitive processes, 
for instance, fish are able to create mental representations of their 
social interactions and their environment (e. g., Bshary et al. 2002, 
Sloman et al. 2006). To cite Laland et al. (2003):
“Gone (or at least obsolete) is the image of fish as drudging and 
dim-witted pea brains, driven largely by instinct, with what little 
behavioural flexibility they possess being severely hampered by an 
infamous three-second-memory.”
It is undisputed that fish are able of simple forms of learning such 
as associative learning. This represents the classical “Pawlow” con-
ditioning and operant learning, i. e. any form of learning in which 
a response becomes associated – via reward or punishment – with 
a stimulus. This form of learning represents reflexive behaviour 
which does not require higher cognitive capabilities. Accordingly, 
associative learning is already present in animals with relatively 
simple nervous systems such as the mollusc Aplysia (Lorenzetti 
et al. 2006). Thus, the presence of associative learning does not 
yet indicate the presence of higher cognitive capabilities in fish. 
However, fish execute cognitive learning processes that go clearly 
beyond associative learning (Bshary et al. 2002, Laland et al. 2003, 
Warburton 2003, Braithwaite 2006). The evolutionary advantage 
of differentiated cognitive capabilities is that they enable animals 
to make decisions and to be able to respond to new situations in a 
flexible rather than in a stereotypic way (Kotrschal and Taborsky 
2010). Fish can recognize spatial patterns and complex temporal 
sequences, they memorize experiences, they display highly devel-
Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology52 53
oped social behaviours, and they are able to learn from experienc-
es in order to adapt their behaviour to new situations. Nowadays, 
fish – particularly species like zebrafish which offer the possibility 
of genetic screens in conjunction with behavioural studies – are 
promoted as models for neurobehavioural research in mammals, 
due to their many behavioural and cognitive similarities to rodents 
(Egan et al. 2009, Sison and Gerlai 2010, Stewart et al. 2010, Wong 
et al. 2010, Gaikwad et al. 2011).
As pointed out by Bshary et al. (2002), cognition is the basis 
for flexible behavioural responses of organisms to both social and 
environmental information. Many fish species, like many mam-
malian species, live in stable social groups of varying size and sex 
composition, and defend their territories or take care for their 
offspring, what requires highly developed cognitive capabilities 
for dealing with social information (Bshary et al. 2002). For in-
stance, individual recognition, usually based on optical cues, does 
exist in such groups (Griffiths 2003). Also for fish species living 
in shoals, individual recognition has been demonstrated (Bshary 
et al. 2002). In addition to individually knowing their mates, fish 
can also monitor their social status and track social relationships 
among third parties (Griffiths 2003, Laland et al. 2003). These 
cognitive capabilities are the basis for more complex social behav-
iours (Braithwaite 2006). Social learning and traditive behaviour 
are widespread among mammalian species, but they also exist in 
fish. This includes, for instance, learning on the location of spawn-
ing sites, learning by observation on what to eat and what to avoid, 
or the learning of anti-predator behaviour by tutors (Bshary et 
al. 2002, Brown and Laland 2003). Fish can gather information 
about relationships of other group members and integrate this 
information into their behaviour (Brown and Laland 2003). In 
fact, fish are able to develop mental representations or “maps” 
on social information. A cognitive or mental map is defined as a 
memory representation of social or environmental information. 
The ability to form mental maps is a key element for the cogni-
tive capabilities of animals, as the mental maps provide the basis 
for decision making and planning, i. e. for non-stereotypic, but 
flexible, “intelligent” behaviour. One example to illustrate this 
may be provided by the study of Dugatkin and Goding (1992) 
on the influence of social factors on mate choice: These authors 
performed experiments in which a female guppy received the 
opportunity to choose between two males. Subsequently, a sec-
ond female was introduced and the first one could observe the 
male preference of the second female. When now the first female 
was allowed to choose again among the two males, it changed 
the initial mate choice and copied the preference of the second 
female. Obviously, the social relationships in the experimental 
group were represented in the mind of the first female (“mental 
map”) and influenced its decision making.
Also very complex forms of social learning such as co- operative 
hunting, which is considered a hallmark of hominid evolution, have 
been reported for fish. There exist a number of examples of co- 
operative intraspecific hunting in fish (Strübin et al. 2011). For 
instance, mackerels hunt in groups for their prey (Hobson 1974). 
Co-operative interspecific hunting has been described by Bshray et 
al. (2002) in a study on giant moray eels, Gymnothorax javanicus, 
and red sea coral grouper, Plectropomus pessuliferus. Both species 
hunt in coral reefs. When prey fish of the grouper hide in caves of 
the corals, which are not accessible to the grouper but to the eel, 
the grouper informs the moray eel on this situation. To this end, 
the grouper uses a special signalling behaviour, which obviously 
is understood by the eel, because the eel then approaches the prey 
in the cave, while the grouper is waiting outside the cave to catch 
the escaping prey fish. The advantage for the eel is that it also can 
feed on the prey. In this example, the grouper solicits the eel to 
hunt together, with the two species playing different roles during 
hunting. In this sense, the co-operative hunting is not an oppor-
tunistic one (occurring by chance), but an intentional one (one 
species motivates the other one to join the hunting).
In addition to cognitive capabilities for processing social infor-
mation, fish possess well-developed cognitive capabilities to be-
haviourally deal with their environment and with environmental 
changes. An example is provided by their capability of learning 
and encoding spatial information on their environment into spa-
tial maps. For a long time, fish orientation, for instance during 
migration, was understood as a primarily genetically fixed be-
haviour. However, as the physical environment can change, it is 
advantageous to be more flexible and to posses the capability to 
learn and process spatial information. In fact, fish can memorize 
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information about their environment and can encode mental 
maps on the spatial relationships between multiple cues, land-
marks or sensory features. This enables the subject to locate an 
object or its own position (Salas et al. 2006). Fish often rely on 
more than one source of spatial information such as visual land-
marks, olfactory landmarks and information from water move-
ment or sun-compass orientation (Odling-Smee and Braithwaite 
2003). An illustrative experiment to demonstrate the capability of 
fish of encoding spatial maps was performed by Burt de Perrera 
(2004a) using the Mexican cavefish, Asytanax fasciatus. This spe-
cies is blind but recognizes physical structures in its environment 
via changes in the flow field around its body. Detection of the flow 
field occurs by means of the neuromasts in the lateral line system. 
Cavefish swim faster when faced with unfamiliar landmarks in 
their environment, but they eventually get familiar with the spatial 
conditions of the environment and then reduce swimming speed. 
When cavefish, after having been habituated to a given spatial 
environment, are then confronted with a change in this spatial 
arrangement, they increase swimming velocity (Burt de Perera 
2004a). This behaviour indicates that the fish memorized the orig-
inal spatial environment and was able to recognize its alteration. 
Apparently, the fish compared the environment they actually per-
ceived with an internal representation of the environment they had 
learnt. The capability to encode spatial maps has been shown for 
a number of other fish species as well, for instance, coral reef fish 
such as butterfly fish memorize the paths connecting their feeding 
patches with their home area. When landmarks along this path 
are displaced, the fish stop swimming and search for the missing 
landmark (Reese 1989).
The capability to encode spatial maps includes also the capa-
bility to remember the spatial and temporal order of landmarks in 
the environment. This has been proven by Burt de Perera (2004b) 
who trained Mexican cavefish to habituate to an environment with 
a distinct arrangement of landmarks. Swimming speed of the fish 
decreased with increasing habituation and familiarity with the spa-
tial map. Then the spatial sequence of the landmarks was switched 
and the fish responded to this by increased swimming velocity, 
indicating that the fish had memorized the original order of land-
marks and recognized the change in the spatial order.
Fish show flexibility of their environmental behaviour. Again, 
spatial orientation may serve as example. Young children, when 
disoriented, use geometric cues for spatial re-orientation, however, 
they fail to re-orient by non-geometric information such as differ-
ently coloured walls (cf. Sovrano et al. 2002). The same has been 
reported for adult individuals of rats and several other mammalian 
species. Adult men, in contrast, are more flexible and make use 
of combinations of geometric and non-geometric information for 
spatial orientation. Sovrano et al. (2002) studied the capability 
of fish to combine different sources of information in spatial ori-
entation. To this end, a spatial orientation test was done with the 
fish species, Xenotoca eiseni, in which either only geometric or 
a combination of geometric and non-geometric landmarks were 
available. The fish were able to use both sources of information 
for their orientation in space, i. e. they showed flexibility in their 
behaviour as human adults do.
An interesting aspect of the capability of fish to cognitively deal 
with environmental information is the learning of numbers. The 
ability to count objects or to discriminate among sets with different 
numbers of items is relevant in many environmental contexts, and, 
accordingly, this ability has been demonstrated in a wide variety 
of vertebrate species and classes. Non-human primates, proverbal 
human infants and human adults possess the ability to sponta-
neously represent numbers in their minds, usually by means of 
a small number system that supports the precise representation 
of individual objects up to numbers of 3 or 4 units, while larger 
numbers are represented as an approximate magnitude system. 
Fish appear to have a similar numerical capacity; they can learn to 
precisely discriminate small quantities and to estimate quantities 
larger than 4 units (Dadda et al. 2009, Agrillo et al. 2009, 2010). 
As observed in human and non-human primates, the numerical 
system of fish appears to have virtually no upper limit while the 
numerical ratio has a clear effect on the performance.
Studies on foraging behaviour demonstrate the cognitive capa-
bilities of fish for integrating social and environmental informa-
tion. Fish use associative learning for finding food, for instance, 
they can easily learn to associate a stimulus (e. g., a visual cue) 
with food reward (Warburton 2003). Beyond classical condi-
tioning, fish are also able of active anticipation of unconditioned 
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stimuli. For example, golden shiners, Notemigonus chrysoleucas, 
were trained to expect food at midday at a specific site in their 
tank. After a short training period, they displayed active food 
anticipatory behaviour, i. e. towards midday they spent more and 
more time at the speci fic feeding site (Reebs 2000). Fish are also 
able for probability matching, i. e. if offered several feeding sourc-
es; they chose the one with the higher likelihood of food reward. 
They remember feeding patch profitabilities, what enables them 
to spend longer time in patches with higher prey densities (War-
burton 2003). Social information is actively used by fish to modify 
their feeding behaviour and to cooperate in the search for food 
(Milinski et al. 1990). For instance, Laland and Williams (1997) 
have shown that guppies learn the way to hidden food sources by 
observing knowledgeable conspecifics. More generally, socially 
transmitted information in fish shoals facilitates the acquisition 
of dietary preferences or the finding of food sources (Brown and 
Laland 2003). Fish employ social information also for strategic 
decisions in their foraging  behaviour, as demonstrated by, e. g., 
Dugatkin and Wilson (1992): Individual bluegill sunfish, Lepomis 
macrochirus, remembered the feeding success with individual con-
specifics, and used this information to prefer or avoid those associates 
for joint food search.
Cognitive functions of fish can be modified by stress, in the 
same ways it is the case in man. This may be illustrated on the 
example of the interplay between stress and memory. For humans 
it is well established that stress affects cognitive functions and can 
impair learning and memory. This is paralleled in fish, as shown, 
e. g., by Gaikwad et al. (2011): Zebrafish were trained in an aquatic 
plus-maze for 14 days using food as reward. Prior to the final test-
ing, the fish were acutely stressed by either one of two ecologically 
relevant stressors, which were exposure to a predator fish species 
or exposure to an alarm pheromone. Acute stress markedly im-
paired spatial memory as well as cued memory of zebrafish in the 
plus maze test, i. e. the affective state associated with the stress 
situation impaired the cognitive performance of the individual. 
This observation with fish corresponds fully with results from plus 
maze studies with mammals.
The most important message from the behavioural studies with 
respect to the question of pain perception is that the cognitive 
capabilities of fish go clearly beyond the level of reflexive, invariant 
or associative learning, but they have higher cognitive capabili-
ties such as recognition and memory of individuals, recognition 
of co-operators, observational and social learning, cultural trans-
mission, and, importantly, logical deductions. An example to the 
latter point is provided by the study of Grosenick et al. (2007). 
These authors used a cichlid species, Astatotilapia burtoni, which 
regularly fights over territories. A male fish – the observer – was 
placed in a central aquarium surrounded by five other tanks con-
taining five males – A, B, C, D, E – of similar size. When transfer-
ring, e. g., male A into aquarium of male B, the fish started to fight, 
and the observer fish could see which individual wins the fight. In 
this way, the observer fish could learn that, e. g. fish A is stronger 
than fish B, and fish B is stronger than fish C. In a next step, the 
observer fish was confronted in a choice test with fish A and C. 
In this situation, the observer fish decided to spend more time in 
fighting the weaker fish, i. e. fish C. Apparently, the observer fish 
memorized the identity of the different individuals, linked this 
with information on their previous fighting performance, and then 
made a logical deduction which individual to attack in order to 
optimize its own chance to win. To tell that fish C is subordinate 
to fish A, the observer fish must be able to form a mental map of 
the hierarchies between individuals A, B and C, i. e. it memorized 
that A defeated B, and B defeated C, and from this it made the 
logical deduction that A should be stronger than C. This cognitive 
process is designated as transitive inference. Animals which are 
known to have the capability of transitive inference include some 
bird species such as crows, and mammals such as rodents and pri-
mates. In man, the ability of transitive inference develops around 
the age of four years, but is not present in younger children. The 
observation of Grosenick et al. (2007) suggets that at least certain 
fish species have the capability for a complex cognitive process 
such as transitive inference.
Another example of fish making logical deductions may be pro-
vided by the study of Hollis et al. (2004). These authors used male 
blue gouramis, Trichogaster trichopterus, which form dominance 
hierarchies. Dominant and subordinate individuals, who knew 
each other, were separated and individually trained to associate 
a light signal with feeding. The fish expressed the learning by ap-
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proaching the aquarium site where the food was dropped as soon 
as the light was switched on, actually already before the food was 
there (anticipatory behaviour – see above). After this training, 
dominant and subordinate fish were combined in pairs and the 
light-feeding experiment was repeated. In this situation, only the 
dominant individuals showed the learned feeding response while 
the subordinates did not; they stayed away from the feeding site 
and adopted a submissive posture. Obviously, the subordinate fish 
knew that the light signal announced the arrival of food, but they 
also knew that they will suffer aggression from the dominants if 
approaching the feeding site. They combined these two types of 
information and made a logical decision to ignore the light signal 
and to stay away from the food in order to avoid aggression by the 
dominant fish.
Taken together, the few examples discussed above provide clear 
evidence that fish possess substantial cognitive capabilities which 
in many aspects parallel those of mammals. This is the case despite 
the absence of the neocortex, what brings us back to the question 
of the neural basis of cognitive capabilities in fish. In mammals, 
high order cognitive attributes such as spatial memories and maps, 
which require complex associational processing, take place in 
hippo campus and neocortex. Fish perform complex spatial tasks 
in a way comparable to mammals, although their neuroanatomy 
is different to mammals: while they have a hippocampus homo-
logue (the – dorsal – pallium of the fish brain is considered to be 
homologous to the tetrapod hippocampus – see above), they lack 
a neocortex. Apparently, fish use brain structures other than the 
neocortex to perform cognitive functions which in mammals are 
at least partly based in the neocortex. As formulated by Bshary 
et al. (2002):
“Fish as a taxon have found solutions to almost all the problems that 
supposedly led to the evolution of a large neocortex and cognitive 
skills in primates.”
3.4.2 Behavioural responses to noxious stimuli
The research discussed above provides strong evidence that fish 
possess explicit cognitive capabilities. This is one important pre-req-
uisite to be able to convert nociceptive information into pain (Gran-
din and Deesing 2003). However, it does not automati cally imply that 
pain perception indeed takes place. Therefore, here we will discuss 
the existing knowledge on the behavioural responses of fish to nox-
ious stimuli, and if these responses are indicative of perception of 
the stimuli as pain.
Fish exposed to (acute) noxious stimuli show a number of phys-
iological responses such as increased ventilation activity, what can 
be explained as cortisol/catecholamine-mediated stress response, as 
well as behavioural responses such as escape response (Sneddon et al. 
2003a, b, Newby and Stevens 2008, Reilly et al. 2008). Fish can also 
learn to avoid noxious stimuli, as shown, for instance, in the study of 
Dunlop et al. (2006): In this experiment, goldfish and rainbow trout 
received electric shocks in certain areas of their aquaria, i. e. they 
were trained to associate a spatial area in a tank with noxious stimu-
lation. Both species learned to avoid that area. Obviously, they were 
able to connect the nociceptive information with spatial information 
to develop spatially cued avoidance behaviour (Dunlop et al. 2006). 
Protective reactions to noxious stimuli such as an escape response are 
a universal characteristic to animal life, and do not require a complex 
nervous systems or higher cognitive capabilities. These reactions can 
occur in the absence of awareness of the noxious stimuli, but may be 
mediated by neural systems in spinal cord/brainstem regions (Rose 
2002). Also avoidance learning of noxious stimuli is not necessarily 
indi cative of higher cognitive processing, but, as pointed out by Rose 
(2009), may represent non-conscious procedural learning.
Behavioural responses can be taken as indicators of pain percep-
tion only if it is possible to demonstrate that they are different to 
behavioural responses nociception alone might trigger (Dunlop et 
al. 2006, Braithwaite 2010). This requires sophisticated experimental 
design and careful interpretation of the results. Even then, however, 
the interpretation of the behavioural responses is difficult and can 
lead to conflicting conclusions. An example from mammals on a 
behavioural response which is indicative of pain perception rather 
than nociception is pain guarding, that is protecting, for instance, an 
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injured leg by avoiding putting weight on it, or going off feed because 
of abdominal injury (Grandin and Deesing 2003). Such an approach 
has been selected by Sneddon et al. (2003a) to obtain insight into the 
capability of trout for pain perception. These authors gave rainbow 
trout injections of painful agents (acetic acid, bee venom) into their 
lips. The hypothesis tested was that if the fish would experience the 
injected solutions as painful, they would try to pain-guard their lips 
and stop feeding. In fact, fish injected with either bee venom or acetic 
acid into the lips stopped feeding for 170 minutes. This was in contrast 
to trout that were injected with a neutral agent (saline); those animals 
stopped feeding for only 80 instead of 170 minutes. Reduced interest 
in food has been observed also in fish with peritonitis, a disease that 
causes severe and chronic visceral pain in man (Bjorge et al. 2011). 
Also in mammals, suppression of food intake is a typical behaviour 
associated with pain experience. Sneddon et al. (2003a, b) interpret-
ed the suppressed feeding activity of rainbow trout injected with 
acetic acid or bee venom into their lip to represent a pain-guarding 
response, i. e. the fish aims to protect the injured part of the body in 
order to avoid the pain sensation. To this end, the fish prioritized the 
aversive stimulus – pain – overt the positive stimulus – food intake –, 
and decided between the two motivational states. This would argue 
against a purely reflexive response; instead it would point to the in-
volvement of cognitive processes and pain perception. This interpre-
tation, however, was challenged by Rose (2007). His criticism did not 
target the validity of the connection between reduced food intake 
and pain, but the validity of the experimental findings, in particular 
the fact that Sneddon et al. (2003a) injected rather large volumes 
of irritants, and that the effect of the treatment was rather small 
(bee venom/acetic-acid injected fish resumed feeding with a less than 
2-hour-delay compared to saline-injected fish). According to Rose 
(2007), the comparatively rapid re-initiation of feeding relative to 
vehicle-injected control fish is inconsistent with the assumption that 
the fish were suffering from pain:
“When it is considered that the acid and venome injections would 
presumably have produced a large-scale and sustained nociceptor 
activation, it is remarkable that the injections had so little effect. 
Rather than proving a capacity for pain, these results suggest resil-
ience to oral trauma by the trout.”
Another challenge to the findings of Sneddon et al. (2003a, b) 
comes from the report of Newby and Stevens (2008), who did not 
observe a suppressive effect of acetic acid injection on the feeding 
response of trout – however, it remains open how comparable the 
experimental conditions of the two studies actually were.
To further elaborate the nature of the behavioural response 
of trout to noxious stimuli, Sneddon et al. (2003b) investigated 
if attention of fish might be affected by the presence of noxious 
stimuli. Attention to novelty requires the animal to focus on a 
single aspect while neglecting the other ones. This behaviour rep-
resents a complex, higher order cognitive process. As known from 
man, pain is well able to distract attention. To test how noxious 
stimuli affect attention in fish, Sneddon et al. (2003b) confronted 
rainbow trout, after injection with either saline vehicle or acetic 
acid solution, with a novel object in their aquarium, and then ob-
served how the fish responded to it. When confronted with a new 
object in their environment, trout initially dare to come close to it, 
apparently being afraid of the unknown object. In the experiment, 
trout that were given the saline injection showed the typical dar-
ing behaviour towards the new object. In contrast, trout given the 
acetic acid injection showed no such behaviour and moved close to 
the new object. The authors interpreted these results to show that 
the attention of the fish to the novelty of the object was impaired 
by the presence of the noxious stimulus, comparable to the atten-
tion behaviour of mammals under pain. Sneddon et al. (2003b) 
hypo thesized that if the distracted attention of trout in the exper-
iment was pain-based, then pain relief should restore the normal 
behavioural response – comparable to the response of man under 
analgesic treatment: while pain distracts our attentional awareness, 
pain relief by analgesic drugs can restore it. To test their hypothesis, 
Sneddon et al. (2003b) administered morphine to acetic acid- 
injected trout, and indeed, after the analgesic treatment the acetic 
acid-injected trout showed the same behavioural response towards 
the novel object as fish from the control group. The authors con-
cluded that the behavioural responses observed in their study are 
beyond reflexive (i. e. nociceptive) behaviour but would indicate 
that the fish were cognitively aware and experienced the aversive 
consequences of the acetic acid treatment. Rose (2007) does not 
agree with this interpretation; according to his view, which refers 
Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology62 63
to findings with sleep-walking man (Plazzi et al. 2005, Ebrahim 
2006), complex behaviour – such as distraction of attention – can 
be executed without awareness of relevant stimuli. Also Chandroo 
et al. (2004b) are critical towards the conclusion of Sneddon et al. 
(2003b); they argue that the labelling of the attention behaviour 
as “complex, higher order cognitive process” is simply based on 
value judgement but not underpinned by functional insight into 
the nature of the cognitive processing.
The influence of analgesic drugs on the behavioural response 
of fish to noxious stimuli has been repeatedly used as argument 
that the response of fish to a noxious stimulus represents pain 
perception (Sneddon 2003a, Nordgreen et al. 2009, Braithwaite 
2010). As described above, fish possess opioid receptors in their 
brain, and, thus, they are sensitive to analgesic drugs. Fish show 
altered behavioural responses to noxious stimuli after treatment 
with compounds such as morphine or lidocain (Sneddon et al. 2003 
a, b, Mettam et al. 2011). However, since opiod receptors occur 
both in brainstem and higher brain areas, an analgesic effect on 
pain/nociceptive behaviour is not sufficient as argument for the 
presence of pain perception in fish, since the analgesic effect may 
be mediated via modulation of nociceptive signalling in brainstem 
regions (Rose 2002, 2007). A clear signalling of pain perception 
would be if the animal is actively seeking pain relief by accessing 
opiates. This type of studies has been done with rodents, but not 
(yet) with fish.
Another indication that a behavioural reaction to noxious stimuli 
represents pain perception rather than nociception comes from 
the flexibility of the response. Avoidance learning (see above) is 
usually interpreted as associative learning, which requires no higher 
cognitive capabilities. However, avoidance learning is not always 
invariable but can show flexibility and incorporate conceptual 
information so that the fish match their response according to the 
environmental situation. For instance, Dunlop et al. (2006), in 
their study of the spatially cued avoidance learning of trout found 
that the learning process could be modified by the presence of 
conspecifics. The authors used a classical choice experiment to 
further explore the flexibility of the behavioural response. The 
experiment built on the postulate that, due to shoaling behaviour, 
fish will prefer to stay close to a conspecific, what represents a 
“pleasure” stimulus to the animal. In the experiment, the fish had 
to make a choice between the “pleasure” stimulus – staying close 
to a conspecific –, and the aversive pain stimulus – a mild electric 
shock. The hypothesis was that the fish will change their avoidance 
behaviour in the vicinity of a conspecific. The results showed that 
the behavioural response to the electric shock was indeed changed 
by the presence of a conspecific. This trade-off between the will-
ingness to remain in the vicinity of the conspecific and receiving 
a mild electric shock was in expectation with the hypothesis. Ap-
parently, the fish made a cost/benefit analysis, and changed their 
pain avoidance behaviour according to differing circumstances. 
The flexibility of fish pain behaviour “suggests that pain responses 
are not just confined to lower brain reflex actions, to some degree, 
involve perception” (Dunlop et al. 2006).
Fish learn to avoid aversive stimuli by linking them with stim-
uli which per se are not aversive. This was shown, for instance, in 
a study by Zerbolio and Royalty (1983) who trained goldfish to 
learn the relationship between neutral signals and an aversive event 
(electric shock). For the training, not only matching signals but also 
oddity signals were used. The fish were well able to learn match-
ing and oddity discrimination in order to avoid being shocked. A 
similar study was performed by Portavella et al. (2004): In this 
experiment, goldfish received an aversive stimulus (mild electric 
shock) in a particular area of their tank when an optical signal 
(green light) was switched on for several seconds. The fish quickly 
learned to avoid that particular area of their tank when the optic 
signal was presented. The conditioned avoidance response was 
retained after the training period. The biochemical basis of the 
conditioning process was enlightened by Xu et al. (2007) in a study 
with zebrafish: the authors could show that treatment of zebrafish 
with antagonists of the N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor impairs the 
avoidance learning. This observation agrees well with findings from 
other vertebrates, where also the N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor is 
involved in conditional learning.
In the experimental arrangements as chosen in the studies of 
Zerbolio and Royalty (1983) and Portavella et al. (2004), a pre-
viously neutral signal – e. g., green light – becomes a conditioned 
aversive stimulus by pairing it with an aversive event (e. g., electric 
shock). Importantly, it is not the stimulus that changes – green light 
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remains green light – but the perception of the stimulus by the 
animal – a neutral signal like green light gets an aversive meaning 
(Cottee 2012). One may call this response a fear reaction. Fear is 
a negative, aversive emotion induced by a perceived threat which 
motivates the animal to avoid the threat or to move away from 
it. Neuroanatomically, the amygdala is the major site of fear pro-
cessing (Killcross et al. 1997). Learned avoidance responses of 
fish to painful stimuli have been repeatedly interpreted as fear 
behaviour. Although some authors consider the use of terms like 
“fear” for fish to represent anthropomorphism, there exists strong 
evidence for the existence of fear behaviour in fish (Yue et al. 2004, 
Nordgreen et al. 2009). This is not surprising as fear is proba-
bly an  evolutionary old adaptation to avoid dangerous situations 
(Dawkins 2000). In addition, fish possess the neuroanatomical sub-
strate for fear processing, as parts of the pallium are homologous 
to the tetrapod amygdala (see above). Fear is different from pain, 
but both conditions can cause suffering (conscious perception of 
unpleasant external and internal stimuli) of animals (Chandroo 
et al. 2004, Huntingford et al. 2006). Investigating fear in fish can 
teach us lessons on pain perception in fish: First, fear – like pain – 
represents an unpleasant mental state, and a capability of fish to feel 
fear implicates the capability for sentience to feel pain (notwith-
standing the fact that the neuroanatomical and neurophysiologcial 
correlates of fear and pain are different). Second, fear responses – 
similar as pain responses – can be learned through Pavovlian 
conditioning, but they can also involve higher cognitive processes. 
For instance, Cantalupo et al. (1998) reported that mosquitofish 
which has been exposed repeatedly to a simulated predator in a 
specific spatial area of the aquarium developed an anticipatory 
fear response, that is the fish crossed the critical spatial area us-
ing rapid zig-zag swimming, even if the predator was not present. 
Apparently, the fish remembered the previous threatful situation 
and attempted to avoid or escape a possible predator attack by 
the specific swimming behaviour. Such an anticipatory behaviour 
points to higher order cognitive processes rather than reflexive 
responses. Finally, fear and pain are closely interconnected, as 
exposure of fish to noxious stimuli modulates affective states such 
as fear or anxiety (Sneddon et al. 2003b, Chandroo et al. 2004a, 
Yue et al. 2004, Egan et al. 2009).
How do the findings from studies on the behavioural reaction of 
fish to noxious stimuli connect to the existing knowledge on func-
tional brain neuroanatomy of fish? Rose (2002, 2007) has been ar-
guing that the neural basis of the response of fish to noxious stimuli 
is based at the levels of brainstem and spinal cord. Spatial informa-
tion, however, is encoded in the telencephalic pallium (Broglio et 
al. 2003, 2005). In addition, the fish telencephalon contains neu-
rons which get activated under noxious stimulation (Dunlop and 
Laming 2006). Finally, there exists evidence that the telencepha-
lon is involved in avoidance learning (Overmier and Papini 1986, 
Onishi 1997) and contains the emotional system critical for fear 
conditioning (Portavella et al. 2004). All these data suggest that 
processing of nociceptive input in the fish brain involves processes 
beyond the brainstem in the telencephalon, what argues against a 
purely reflexive reaction requiring only lower brain centres such 
as spinal cord and brain stem.
Strong disagreement with the conclusions above comes from 
Rose (2002, 2007). According to this author, the brain receives 
nociceptive information from the spinal cord and cranial nerves. 
Working together with the spinal cord, the brain generates respons-
es which cause the organism to escape or to avoid the noxious stim-
uli. These responses are produced by innate neural programs and 
include reactions such as withdrawal of the stimulated body part 
or locomotion. All of these responses are generated by lower levels 
of the central nervous system, mainly brain stem and spinal cord, 
while the cerebral hemispheres would serve mainly to “modulate” 
behaviour. However, Rose (2007) does not refer to studies like 
those of Broglio et al. (2003, 2005) or Portavella et al. (2004) which 
postulate a stronger involvement of the forebrain into behavioural 
responses of fish, so that is not possible to judge if Rose considers 
the arguments of those authors to be conclusive. Likewise, Rose 
(2002, 2007) argues that behaviour of fish is inconsistent with the 
assumption of pain perception. Unfortunately, the literature on 
fish behaviour and cognition is somewhat weakly represented in 
the work of Rose (2002, 2007), what makes it difficult to weigh his 
arguments against the evidence provided by the studies discussed 
above. Rose (2007) claims that interpretations of behavioural 
experiments often suffer from “anthropomorphism” and that we tend 
to humanize animal behaviours – a criticism, which is correct, at 
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least to a certain extent. Still, we need to find ways how to deal with 
and interpret different levels of complexity in animal behaviour. 
The approach of Rose to distinguish only two levels – conscious 
(implicating pain perception) and non-conscious (implicating noci-
ception) (see next chapter) – may be too simplistic to reflect grad-
ual evolutionary developments in way how vertebrates deal with 
nociceptive signals. It is clear that we must exercise some caution 
when we interpret animal behaviour in terms of pain (Braithwaite 
and Boulcott 2007). However, at least several of the behavioural 
studies discussed above suggest that behavioural responses of fish 
to noxious stimuli are not merely a reflexive response but involve 
higher order cognitive processes and probably pain perception. 
Overall, the available information from behavioural studies strong-
ly argues for the presence of some form of pain perception in fish. 
4. Consciousness in fish 
It is the conscious perception of noxious stimuli that turns a no-
ciceptive signal into the experience we designate as pain. Thus, 
consciousness is an intrinsic component of pain perception in man. 
Accordingly, the IASP definition of pain explicitly refers to pain 
as “conscious experience”. Given the central role of consciousness 
in pain perception, the question is if fish are conscious organisms. 
This question has taken a prominent role in the discussion on pain 
experience of fish. The overall direction of this discussion is well 
reflected by Rose (2002) who argues that “in order to prove that a 
fish feels pain, it is necessary to show that a fish has consciousness”. 
While this sounds logical, practically the approach is hindered by 
two obstacles:
• what do we actually mean – in biological terms – when we talk 
of “consciousness”; and
• how do we assess consciousness, what operational indicators can 
we use to demonstrate presence or absence of consciousness?
In the following, it will be attempted to review shortly the ongoing 
discussion on the existence of fish consciousness, with the focus 
on the biological literature. The philosophical dimension of the 
question will not be addressed here, as this is excellently done in 
the study of Wild (2012).
The term of animal consciousness has a “tumultuous history” 
(Cottee 2012) in life sciences. In the Cartesian view, only man was 
considered to have a conscious mind while animals were understood 
as non-conscious “automatons”. Early in the 20 th century, reduction-
ist approaches of neurobehaviourists tried to explain animal behav-
iour on the basis of reflexes, “tropisms”, instinct or associations, and 
were sceptical towards a concept of animal consciousness (Greenspan 
and Baars 2005). Consciousness as a study object of life sciences 
Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology68 69
became accepted only later in the 20 th century, and it is now get-
ting increasingly important in animal welfare research, although the 
term remains controversial due to the problems in empirically demon-
strating the existence of animal consciousness. These controversies 
are still reflected in the current literature on animal consciousness 
in general and fish consciousness in particular (e. g., Dawkins 2000, 
Chandroo et al. 2004b, Arlinghaus et al. 2007, Cottee 2012).
An instrumental approach to make the term consciousness ac-
cessible to biological research is to discriminate different levels 
or forms of consciousness. Rose (2002), as many other authors, 
distinguishes two forms of consciousness, primary and secondary. 
Primary (or feeling) consciousness refers to the moment-to-mo-
ment awareness of sensory and emotional experiences. Secondary 
consciousness (or self-awareness) includes awareness of one’s self 
as an entity that exists separately from other entities. In this system, 
secondary consciousness is restricted to man and probably some 
other primates, while it is primary consciousness which matters 
in the case of fish.
Braithwaite (2010) adopted a scheme developed by Ned Block 
who distinguishes three forms of consciousness:
• access consciousness, as the capability to think about a mental 
state. This would include the capability to generate a mental 
map by combining diverse pieces of information, and to deduce 
from this mental map guidance for decisions, for instance, to 
use a mental map of the spatial environment to plan a route for 
moving from A to B;
• phenomenal consciousness, as the capability to sense envi-
ronmental and social information and to connect it with af-
fective-emotional information, that is seeing, smelling, feeling 
the world. Specifically for the ability to feel and experience 
emotions, some authors in the biological literature use the term 
“sentience”;
• monitoring or self-consciousness, as the capability to think on 
one’s own actions.
Also Panksepp (2005) distinguishes several tiers of animal con-
sciousness. Importantly, he understands the various tiers as an 
evolutionary continuum, thus, it is not a question of having or 
not having a specific form of consciousness but there are multiple 
layers of emergence. According to Panksepp (2005):
“Primary consciousness may reflect raw sensory/perceptual feelings 
and (various) types of internal emotional/motivational experiences. 
Secondary consciousness may reflect the capacity to have thoughts 
about experiences, especially about how external events relate to 
internal events. Finally, there are tertiary forms of consciousness – 
thoughts about thoughts, awareness of awareness – much of which 
is unique to humans and requires expansive neocortical tissues that 
permit linguistic-symbolic transformation of simple thoughts and re-
membered experiences. Those who are not willing to give animals any 
consciousness are probably thinking about the tertiary human-typ-
ical linguistic variants. They may also be generalizing too readily 
from human perceptual consciousness, which is clearly dependent 
on neocortical functions, to an affective consciousness whose locus 
of control is largely sub-neocortical. There are reasons to believe that 
affective experience may have provided an evolutionary platform for 
the emergence of more complex layers of consciousness”.
One lesson to be learned from the discussion above is that con-
sciousness can mean rather different things, and it needs a clear 
definition what we mean when we talk of consciousness in fish. It 
is evident that it does not refer to something like self-conscious-
ness, but it deals with “simple” consciousness (corresponding to 
what has been said above about the “simple” pain experience of 
fish) – some form of basic cognitive and emotional awareness. A 
second lesson from the discussion on forms of consciousness is 
that conscious awareness of internal and external states is probably 
not an all-or-nothing phenomenon but rather a gradually evolving 
property. Its evolution may even be limited to specific subject mat-
ters which are appropriate for the animal’s ecology (Chandroo et 
al. 2004b). As stated by de Gelder et al. (2011):
“Viewed from an anthropocentric perspective, emotions are intrin-
sically linked to the highest human mental faculties seated in the 
neocortex. However, from another perspective, emotions are essen-
tially adaptive action dispositions, and phylogenetic continuity is 
the central heuristic principle of affective neuroscience.” 
Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology70 71
The discussion on what consciousness actually is in biological 
terms leads to the second important question: how can we assess 
that an animal is conscious, what are the neural correlates of 
consciousness and which operational indicators do we have to 
“measure” the presence of consciousness in an organism? In man, 
the standard behavioural indicator for consciousness is “accurate 
report”, the ability to being aware of and to report – verbally 
or non-verbally – a sensory event (Seth et al. 2005). Behaviour-
al tests such as accurate report are difficult to interpret when 
used in animals. Here, alternative behavioural tests are need-
ed for assessing consciousness in animals. The accurate report 
test is based on the assumption that consciousness is a percep-
tual state in which the individual does report the presence of 
a stimulus and/or its attributes such as the emotional content, 
while a non-conscious perception is a state when the individual 
does not report the presence of a stimulus or its attributes, even 
though there is evidence, for instance from neurophysiological 
measurements, that the stimulus has been processed by the indi-
vidual (Tamietto and de Gelder 2010). One may train an animal 
to non-verbally report a sensory signal, for instance, by pushing 
a button, however, it is difficult to distinguish if this represents 
conscious perception or conditional learning. An example of a 
powerful behavioural test is the behaviour of animals towards 
psychoactive drugs: Many humans find drugs that activate opi-
od receptors in the brain or facilitate dopamine activity to be 
pleasurable. For a number of animal species it has been shown 
(for instance, in “self-rewarding” experiments) that they are also 
responsive to such hedonistic drugs and express strong desire for 
them. In addition, neurophysiologically the drugs act similarly 
in the brains of animals and man. The behavioural response of 
animals towards psychoactive drugs clearly suggests that affective 
consciousness is present in these animals, because otherwise the 
behaviourally expressed desire of the animals for these drugs 
is difficult to explain (Panksepp 2005). Nevertheless, already 
these two examples may illustrate that the distinction between 
conscious and non-conscious perception is not a straightforward 
exercise if it comes to animals, and the borderlines between the 
two perception types are fluent, depending to a large extent on 
the methods used.
A frequently used approach to assess consciousness in non- human 
species is a comparative approach which uses parameters which 
have been shown to be associated with human consciousness as a 
reference and benchmark. Principally, this is the same approach as 
already described for pain assessment in non-human species (see 
above). This approach yields the more conclusive results, the more 
closely the evolutionary relationship is between the species under 
question and man. The operational indicators of consciousness in 
animals rely on structures and functions which are analogous and 
homologous to neural correlates of human consciousness. Neu-
roanatomical correlates of conscious perception in man are the 
thalamocortical system as well as the mesencephalic reticular for-
mation, while certain neurotransmitter and opiod systems as well 
as certain EEG patterns represent key neurophysiological corre-
lates (Baars 2005, Edelman et al. 2005, Seth et al. 2005). Edelman 
et al. (2005) give a nice illustration of the scopes and limits of the 
comparative approach. They examine the possibility that (prima-
ry) consciousness exists in birds and in cephalopods (Octopus). 
The neuroanatomy of birds is distinguished from the human brain 
in a number of aspects, for instance, the presence of the pallial 
“Wulst” instead of the neocortex. However, histological, molecular 
and ontogenetic markers identify numerous structural homologies 
and suggest that many of neuronal properties and circuitry that 
underlie the mammalian cortical system are already in place in 
birds (Edelman et al. 2005). For instance, the somatomotor cir-
cuitry within the avian dorsal pallium appears to be homologous 
to the mammalian basal ganglia-cortico-thalamic loop. For several 
other structures, like the layers of the avian Wulst, the identifi-
cation of homologies remains contentious. The overall evidence 
from this homology approach, however, suggests that birds have 
at least some of the necessary substrates and conditions for prima-
ry consciousness (Edelman et al. 2005). The situation gets much 
more complicated if it comes to cephalopods. Here, due to the 
distant phylogenetic paths mammals and cephalopods have taken 
in their evolutionary history, the search goes not for homologous 
but for analogous neuroanatomical structures and neurophysio-
logical functions. Although cephalopods undoubtedly are able 
of higher sensory and cognitive functions, the currently available 
knowledge is by far not sufficient to come up with any conclusive 
Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology Fish. Nociception and pain | Contributions to Ethics and Biotechnology72 73
statement on the possibility of consciousness in this animal group. 
Available knowledge on fish appears to be somewhat halfway be-
tween birds and cephalopods - although the available information 
strongly increased over the last 10 to 20 years. Nevertheless, there 
remain significant knowledge gaps what makes all statements on 
the presence of consciousness in fish fairly speculative.
According to Rose (2002), consciousness and pain perception 
in man depend critically on the presence of the neocortex. There-
fore, this author took the absence of a neocortex homologue in 
fish as a main argument to dispute the possibility of conscious-
ness and pain perception in fish. Rose (2002) says that subcor-
tical and brainstem regions may be able to modulate perceptive 
processes in the cortex, but without cortex they are not capable 
of conscious perception of stimuli. He supports his view with 
observations from humans with cerebral cortex destruction or 
congenital cortex deficit, who appear to be in a vegetative state, 
with conscious awareness being abolished. However, these data 
have to be considered cautiously, since the decorticate patients 
have also compromised thalamocortical activity, what makes it 
difficult to distinguish between the role of the neocortex and 
the non-cortex structures (cf. Chandroo et al. 2004b). Also find-
ings on the effects of cortical, thalamic and brainstem lesions on 
human consciousness (Seth et al. 2005) are in contradiction to 
the logics of Rose (2002). Current day evi dence challenges the 
view of Rose (2002) and suggests that it is too one-dimensional 
(Pessoa 2008, Tamietto and de Gelder 20110). Consciousness is 
understood to depend more on an interaction of different brain 
regions – with the neocortex having a prominent role in this in-
teraction – rather than on one specific region alone (Baars 2005, 
Panksepp 2005, Tamietto and de Gelder 2010) – a view that is 
in line with current understanding of pain arising from the pain 
matrix rather than from the neocortex alone. There is increas-
ing evidence that evolutionary old, non-cortical brain regions 
are involved in maintaining the state of consciousness while the 
neocortex regions, (in interaction with the thalamus) sustain 
conscious content. The concept that consciousness is a network 
property rather than the property of one particular brain struc-
ture is also supported from the observation of widespread brain 
activation during conscious perception (Seth et al. 2005).
Brain regions other than the neocortex may functionally substi-
tute in non-mammalian vertebrates if it comes to generation of 
consciousness. The sub-cortical regions may be able to generate 
simple levels of consciousness such as affective consciousness 
(Panksepp 2005, 2011). Major loci for affective experiences in 
both non- mammalian vertebrates and mammals including man are 
situated in very similar and very ancient regions of the vertebrate 
brain, such as thalamus, amygdala, hippocampus or brainstem, and 
it is within these circuits where emotional responses can be trig-
gered (Panksepp 2005, 2011, Pessoa 2008, Tamietto and de Gelder 
2010). Also in fish, there exists good experimental evidence of a 
role of these evolutionary old brain areas in cognitive and emotion-
al processes (e. g., Portavella et al. 2004, Vargas et al. 2009). Rose 
(2002) rejected the generation of consciousness through brain re-
gions other than the neocortex on the following grounds:
“Fish brains are understood well enough to make it highly implau-
sible that there are alternate, functionally uncommitted systems 
that could meet the requirements for generation of consciousness, 
namely, exceptionally high interconnectivity within the cortex and 
between cortex and thalamus, and enough non-sensory cortical 
mass and local functional diversification to permit regionally spe-
cialized, differentiated activity patterns.”
Even with respect to non-human mammals, Rose (2002) argues 
that they may have little capacity for consciousness and, thus, for 
pain perception:
“The type of neocortex most essential to consciousness, the non-sen-
sory association cortex, comprises the vast majority of human cer-
ebral cortex, but it is a very small proportion of the neocortex in 
most mammals. Even great apes, having substantially less non-sen-
sory association cortex than humans, would be unlikely candidates 
for human-like higher consciousness.”
The argumentation of Rose (2002), however, is biased in two ways. 
First, his view of the role of the “non-sensory association cortex” 
is not appropriate in the light of recent research. As discussed in 
the chapter on human brain, cortical areas which are involved 
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in “non-sensory association” such as the anterior cingulate cortex 
or the insular cortex are nowadays seen as having much broader 
functions than “non-sensory association”; actually, key to their 
function is to integrate diverse processes. Thus, the argumentation 
on the basis of relative brain mass reserved for the non-sensory 
association function appears to be somewhat flawed. Second, Rose 
(2002) denies the presence of “human-like higher consciousness” 
in non-mammalian vertebrates (and perhaps even in many mam-
malian species), but the question is not whether fish have a human- 
like consciousness, but whether fish are capable of a simple form 
of consciousness.
Given the difficulties to argue for the presence of consciousness 
in fish on the basis of neuroanatomical data, several authors took 
the demonstration of higher cognitive capabilities, as evidenced in 
a number of behavioural studies (see above), as argument to sup-
port the possibility of consciousness in this animal group. However, 
as emphasized by Rose (2002, 2007) and Chandroo et al. (2004b), 
higher cognitive processing is not synonymous with conscious cog-
nition. What we know for fish is that they are able to create mental 
representations of their environment and their social relationships – 
a fact that would fit Braithwaite’s (2010) description of access con-
sciousness. Rich Moccia, Ian Duncan, Stephanie Yue and their 
colleagues have discussed intensively the available evidence for 
the existence of phenomenal consciousness in fish (Chandroo et 
al. 2004a, b, Cottee 2012). The general tenor of these discussions 
is that adult fish probably do experience some of the adverse states 
that humans associate with pain and emotional distress, and that 
they have the cognitive  capacity necessary for conscious suffering. 
The main arguments to support this conclusion are (cf. Hunting-
ford et al. 2006):
• fish are capable of complex learning, and they can form mental 
representations of their environment, using forebrain structures 
that are homologous to those in birds and mammals;
• fish process different types of information in different areas of 
the forebrain, suggesting that these experiences can be inte-
grated and enable the fish to generate appropriate and flexible 
adaptive responses (Portavella et al. 2004, Yue et al. 2004);
• fish can remember emotive experiences;
• fish produce endogenous opioids;
• fish display a complex and in no way stereotyped behaviour, 
particularly social fish species.
Overall, the answer of the various authors on the question of fish 
consciousness is positive, although many aspects remain uncertain 
and are subject of equivocal interpretation. The question is what 
level of confidence we actually can achieve and what level of un-
certainty we have to accept, given the limitations in the available 
operational indicators to assess consciousness. In this context, we 
must not overlook that also in man the term consciousness has 
some vagueness and is not always unequivocally defined (Bateson 
1991). Self-reflective awareness is of course present in adults; how-
ever, children appear to gain full awareness of themselves as an 
entity distinct from others only around the second year of life. A 
child of less than two years does not have full reflexive conscious-
ness, although when being hurt, it is aware of the pain. Another 
example is the learning of language by young children which is a 
unique feature of man, but as adults we do not consciously remem-
ber how we learned the language (but we realize how difficult it 
can be to consciously learn another language). Thus, are young 
children conscious or not? The question cannot be answered by 
a simple yes or no, and the same may apply when asking on con-
sciousness of animals.
Finally, a critical question is whether the discussion on con-
sciousness is indeed helpful to answer the question of pain percep-
tion in fish. Many of the arguments used in the discussion on fish 
consciousness are “déjà vu” arguments and have already been used 
in the discussion of pain perception in fish. Instead of introducing 
new aspects, it appears that the consciousness discussion is partly 
repetitive to the pain discussion and thus does not really promote 
our understanding of pain perception in fish (this, however, applies 
only for the biological aspects of the discussion and differs clearly 
from the philosophical discussion on fish consciousness – see Wild 
2012).
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5. Conclusions
The previous chapters discussed neuroanatomical, neurophysio-
logical and behavioural data which are used as operational indi-
cators to assess the capability of fish for conscious pain perception. 
They also address the existence of consciousness and in fish and 
to what extent this discussion furthers our understanding of pain 
perception in fish. Pain is a human experience and as such, the 
term cannot be directly transferred to fish, but we have to rely on 
diverse constructs, all of them with strengths and weaknesses in 
accessing animal minds.
The discussion in the biological literature on pain perception 
and consciousness in animals centers roughly around two con-
cepts, the all-or-nothing concept and the continuity concept. In 
simplified form, the all-or-nothing concept says that in the absence 
of certain properties like e. g. neocortex, pain perception is im-
possible. A  basic assumption behind this concept is that “all the 
systems involved in the detection of pain have evolved as unitary 
package, which is either present and works in its entity, or is absent 
and does not work at all” (Bateson 1991). The continuity con-
cept emphasizes the evolutionary, stepwise development of pain 
perception; it assumes that already sub-systems can provide some 
level of function, even if they do not support the full functional 
level as achieved in man but only a restricted or simple form of 
pain perception. What is clear, however, is that the quality of pain 
experience in animals like fish is different from pain experience 
in man. Basically, the question is not “does fish feel pain?” but 
“which pain does fish feel?”
If a animal species displays analogies and/or homologies of the 
operational indicators which are correlated with pain perception 
in man – as the species serving as benchmark –, this provides evi-
dence that the species has the capability of pain perception. This 
will never be a yes or no-decision, as no animal species will be 
identical to man, but will show more or less pronounced differenc-
es of the indicator parameters. A decision is more easy to achieve 
with species closely related to man, e. g. other primates, as these 
species have many similarities to man. The results of the compar-
ative approach will get more disputable, the more phylogenetical-
ly distant the species under consideration is. The key question is 
where to draw the line: when are the similarities still sufficient to 
assume that the species is able of at least a simple pain sensation, 
and when is this no longer the case? It appears that currently there 
exists no general agreement on the scientific criteria where to draw 
this line, and on the basis of what considerations.
As outlined above, the assessment of pain perception in fish on 
the basis of structural and functional analogies and homologies 
bears considerable uncertainty. Therefore, such an assessment 
should not rely on a single, stand-alone parameter but should 
build on multiple lines of evidence. Bateson (1991) as well as 
EFSA (2009) listed a series of parameters which they considered 
to be useful in providing evidence for or against pain perception 
in animals including fish. All these criteria were addressed in the 
present review, and they are summarized in the following table.
Fish fulfill all criteria in the list above except for the presence of 
the neocortex. It is indeed this fact that has been put forward as 
main argument against the existence of pain perception and con-
sciousness in fish. As discussed above, presence of the neocortex 
is essential for human pain perception and consciousness, however, 
it is under debate to what extent the neocortex alone drives pain 
perception, and whether the presence of phylogenetically older 
parts of the pain matrix would be sufficient to create a simple form 
of pain experience. It is clear that the question on pain perception 
is fish is not a matter of majority decision (six criteria pro pain per-
ception, one criterion contra pain perception), still it is debatable 
if the single “no”-criterion – absence of the neocortex – has such 
a weight that it outrules all the other criteria, and if it is indeed a 
strong enough argument to exclude that fish have the capability of 
pain experience. In this context, it needs to be emphasized how 
much our picture of cognitive capabilities of fish has changed over 
the last two decades. If the table below would have been set up 20 
years ago, in many cases the answer to the question “present in 
fish?” would have been a “no” or a question mark.
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In conclusion, the overall balance of evidence from the available 
published information indicates that fish or at least some fish 
species have the capability to experience pain.
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Criterion: Present in fish?
Existence of functional receptors sen-
sitive to noxious stimuli (nociceptors)
Yes
Existence of brain structures homolo-
gous or analogous to the human brain 
structures involved in pain perception 
(pain matrix)
No in the case of the neocortex, yes for 
subcortical structures like amygdala 
and hippocampus; yes for thalamus and 
brainstem
Existence of nervous pathways  
connecting peripheral nociceptors to 
higher brain centres
Yes
Existence of endogenous opiods  
and opioid receptors in the central  
nervous system
Yes
Analgesics act in reducing the  
response to noxious stimuli
Yes
Existence of complex forms of  
learning including avoidance learning 
of noxious stimuli
Yes
Suspension of normal behaviour 
under impact of noxious stimuli
Yes
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Die Nanobiotechnologie verfügt 
über ein enormes Potenzial. Dies 
lässt sich anhand von breiten 
(möglichen) Anwendungen in 
der Biomimetik, Medizin, Land-
wirtschaft und Ernährung («Na-
no-Food») ver deutlichen. Das 
Buch legt die in der Literatur dis-
kutierten ethischen Aspekte der 
Nanobiotechnologie dar. Es han-
delt sich hierbei um die Aspekte 
Risiken für Mensch und Umwelt, 
Gerechtigkeit («Nano-Divide»), 
militärische Anwendungen, Da-
tenschutz, Nanomedizin und 
Enhancement. Es liefert keine 
Antworten, sondern soll helfen, 
die Diskussion über den ethisch 
angemessenen Umgang mit der 
Nanobiotechnologie besser zu 
strukturieren.
Andreas Bachmann
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2006
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Die Schweizerische Gesetzge-
bung verlangt, dass nicht nur 
bei Tieren, sondern auch bei 
Pflanzen die Würde der Krea-
tur geachtet wird. Bei Tieren gibt 
es gewisse Anhaltspunkte, worin 
ihre Würde besteht. Bei Pflanzen 
stellt sich die Frage, welche ihrer 
Eigenschaften Würde begründen 
könnten. Das Buch befasst sich 
aus der Sicht der modernen Bio-
logie mit Pflanzen und deren Un-
terscheidung von Tieren. Auch 
wenn sie sich in ihrer Organisa-
tion grundsätzlich unterscheiden, 
so sind sie sich hinsichtlich ihrer 
zellulären Strukturen und dem 
Grad ihrer Komplexität doch sehr 
ähnlich. Das Buch beschreibt die 
Fähig keiten von Pflanzen, Infor-
mationen aus ihrer Umgebung 
aufzu nehmen, zu speichern und 
darauf zu reagieren. Vor diesem 
Hintergrund wird argumentiert, 
dass die Unterschiede zwischen 
Pflanzen und Tieren lediglich 
gradueller Natur sind. Aus bio-
logischer Sicht kann keine Hö-
herentwicklung von Tieren im 
Vergleich zu Pflanzen postuliert 
werden.
Jürg Stöcklin
Die Pflanze
Moderne Konzepte der Biologie
2007
77 Seiten
BBL-Artikelnummer: 810.002
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«Was ist Leben?» Zunächst wird 
gezeigt, warum diese Frage so 
schwierig zu beantworten ist und 
warum auch die Biowissenschaft 
wenig zur Aufklärung dieser Fra-
ge beiträgt. Im Unterschied dazu 
beschäftigt sich die Philosophie 
seit ihren Anfängen intensiv mit 
der Frage nach dem Leben. Bio-
philosophische Theo rien des 20. 
Jahrhunderts greifen auf diese 
Positionen zurück und machen 
von unterschiedlichsten Ansätzen 
ausgehend die Selbstbezüglich-
keit von Leben deutlich. Der so 
gewonnene Lebens-Begriff wird 
an Entwürfen «Künstlichen Le-
bens» getestet, z. B. an Projek-
ten der Synthetischen Biologie. 
Dabei wird untersucht, ob und 
inwiefern der Lebens-Begriff hier 
anwendbar ist. Zum Abschluss 
der Untersuchung wird die 
Selbstbezüglichkeit von Leben-
digem noch einmal aufgegriffen. 
Jüngste naturwissenschaftliche 
Beo bachtungen lassen sich da-
hingehend deuten, dass Leben 
sich in der Stiftung von Sinn und 
Bedeutung artikuliert.
Andreas Brenner
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2007
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Welchen Risiken darf eine 
Person sich selbst und  andere 
aussetzen? «Ethik des Risikos» 
befasst sich mit der ethischen 
Bewertung von Handlungsent-
scheidungen, deren Umsetzung 
mit Unsicherheit verbunden ist. 
Im ersten Teil werden die we-
sentlichen risikoethischen Be-
griffe definiert und verschiedene 
Risikosituationen voneinander 
abgegrenzt. Im zweiten Teil 
werden drei  unterschiedliche 
Entscheidungstheorien der Risi-
koethik (Bayesianische Entschei-
dungstheorie, Maximin-Prinzip, 
Precautionary Principle) dis-
kutiert. Diese umfassen Posi-
tionen, die von einem durch 
Rationalität geprägten Ansatz 
reichen bis hin zu einem, der 
die Vermeidung des worst case 
anstrebt. Im dritten Teil werden 
weitere für die risikoethische 
Debatte bedeutende Aspekte 
ansatzweise ausgeführt, z. B. die 
Funktion der Zustimmung und 
der Kompensation, Individual-
rechte sowie die Eigentums-
rechte an Risiken und deren 
Verteilung.
Benjamin Rath
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2008
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ISBN : 978-3-905782-03-5
Synthetische Biologie hat, ähn-
lich wie Physik und Chemie, 
nicht nur die Analyse, sondern 
auch den Nach- und Neubau ihrer 
Gegenstände zum Ziel. Mit der 
 Vision von der Erschaffung neuer 
einzelliger  Lebensformen rückt 
dieses Forschungsfeld Lebendi-
ges in den Bereich technischer 
Erzeugbarkeit. Die Autoren dif-
ferenzieren Forschungs feld und 
Anwendungsgebiete der Synthe-
tischen Bio logie und systemati-
sieren die zentralen ethischen 
Fragen. Anhand von Metaphern 
wie «living machine» verdeutli-
chen sie, wie unklar der ontolo-
gische Status des neu geformten 
Lebendigen werden kann. Dar-
über hinaus argumentieren sie, 
dass der Schritt von der gen-
technischen Manipulation zur 
Kreation neuer Lebensformen 
Konsequenzen für das mensch-
liche Selbstverständnis haben 
kann. Missbrauchsgefahren wer-
den ebenso diskutiert wie die 
Notwendigkeit der Prüfung von 
Risiken einer unkontrollierten 
Verbreitung syn thetischer Orga-
nismen.
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Ce volume pose la question du 
statut moral des êtres vivants ar-
tificiels. Il est important de déter-
miner ce statut, car c’est sur lui 
que nous nous appuierons pour 
savoir comment nous devrons 
les traiter et quelles limites la 
morale imposera à l’usage que 
nous en ferons. Jusqu’à pré-
sent, les êtres vivants que nous 
connaissions étaient tous natu-
rels, mais si nous produisons des 
organismes artificiels, ce carac-
tère artificiel aura-t-il un impact 
sur leur statut moral?
 Pour pouvoir y répondre, cet 
ouvrage commence par préciser 
ce que signifie l’attribution d’un 
statut moral à une entité. Puis, 
défendant une conception de la 
vie qui se veut en accord avec les 
sciences biologiques, il examine 
les différentes significations que 
prend l’opposition du naturel et 
de l’artificiel. En conclusion, il 
établit que le fait qu’un orga-
nisme vivant soit naturel ou ar-
tificiel n’a aucun impact sur son 
statut moral.
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Die Debatte über ethische As-
pekte des «Human Enhance-
ment» wirft auch ein neues Licht 
auf die wissenschaftlich-techni-
sche «Verbesserung» von Tieren. 
Zwar ist «Animal  Enhancement» 
in vielerlei Hinsicht ein altbe-
kanntes Phänomen. In der Land-
wirtschaft werden Tiere seit 
langem gezielt verbessert, und 
einige Tierversuche lassen sich 
gleichfalls so begreifen. Während 
aber die Debatte um «Human 
Enhancement» stark von der 
Basisunterscheidung zwischen 
Heilen und Verbessern geprägt 
ist, ist diese Unterscheidung im 
Tierbereich weitgehend irrele-
vant. Durch aktuelle wissen-
schaftlich-technische Tendenzen 
ändern sich aber zumindest die 
Interventionstiefe und potenziell 
auch die ethische Bedeutung der 
Eingriffe. Dieses Buch bietet 
einen breiten Überblick über 
Entwicklungen im Bereich der 
konvergierenden Technologien 
und Wissenschaften, die für 
«Animal Enhancement»  relevant 
sind, und diskutiert zentrale 
 ethische Fragen.
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Die «Primaten» als Tierordnung 
wurden in den letzten Jahren 
in ihrem rechtlichen und mora-
lischen Status teils erheblich 
aufgewertet. Worauf gründet 
sich diese Neubewertung? Was 
leisten die ethischen Argumenta-
tionen, die ihr zugrunde liegen? 
Ist es der «Affen» Nähe und 
Ähnlichkeit zum Menschen, die 
sie so besonders im Tierreich 
machen? Oder sind sie ethisch 
gar nicht mehr als «Tiere» zu 
behandeln, sondern als «Per-
sonen»?
 Die vorliegende Studie argu-
mentiert auf dem Grund jener 
einzigartigen Fähigkeiten und 
Eigenschaften, die Primaten 
zu ganz besonderen Subjekten 
ihres Lebens macht. Von hier 
aus rechtfertigt sich ihr mora-
lischer Status, ihre Würde, die 
sich vor neuen technischen Ein-
griffen zu bewähren hat.
Peter Kunzmann, 
Nikolaus Knoepffler
Primaten
Ihr moralischer Status
2011
120 Seiten
BBL-Artikelnummer:
810.009.d
ISBN : 978-3-905782-07-3
Das Bild vom Fisch hat sich 
durch die Forschung der  letzten 
20 Jahre erheblich verändert. 
Fische gelten nicht mehr als 
Reflexmaschine, sondern als 
 kognitive Wesen. Sie leben in 
komplexen sozialen Gemein-
schaften, können Individuen un-
terscheiden,  ihren Status ver folgen, 
kooperieren und von einander 
lernen. Neben kognitiven Fähig-
keiten ist auch das Bewusstsein 
bei Fischen in den Fokus der 
Aufmerksamkeit gerückt wor-
den. Fische verfügen über die 
Voraussetzungen, um Schmer-
zen zu empfinden. Diese Entde-
ckung hat zur Debatte geführt, 
ob Fische wirklich Schmerzen 
empfinden. Das wirft nicht nur 
biologische, sondern auch phi-
losophische Fragen auf: Was ist 
Schmerz? Was ist Bewusstsein? 
Wie können wir erkennen, ob ein 
Wesen bewusste Empfindungen 
hat? Dieser Band diskutiert das 
neue Bild vom Fisch und argu-
mentiert, dass Fische tatsächlich 
Schmerzen empfinden.
Markus Wild
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